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PREDICTIVE CONTRACTING 
Spencer Williams* 
This Article examines how contract drafters can use data 
on contract outcomes to inform contract design. Building on 
recent developments in contract data collection and analysis, 
the Article proposes “predictive contracting,” a new method of 
contracting in which contract drafters can design contracts 
using a technology system that helps predict the connections 
between contract terms and outcomes. Predictive contracting 
will be powered by machine learning and draw on contract 
data obtained from integrated contract management systems, 
natural language processing, and computable contracts. The 
Article makes both theoretical and practical contributions to 
the contracts literature. On a theoretical level, predictive 
contracting can lead to greater customization, increased 
innovation, more complete contract design, more effective 
balancing of front-end and back-end costs, better risk 
assessment and allocation, and more accurate term pricing for 
negotiation. On a practical level, predictive contracting has the 
potential to significantly alter the role of transactional lawyers 
by providing them with access to previously unavailable 
information on the statistical connections between contract 
terms and outcomes. In addition to these theoretical and 
practical contributions, the Article also anticipates and 
addresses limitations and risks of predictive contracting, 
including technical constraints, concerns regarding data 
privacy and confidentiality, the regulation of the unauthorized 
practice of law and the potential for exacerbating information 
inequality. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines how contract drafters can use data 
on contract outcomes1 to inform contract design.2 Building on 
recent developments in contract data collection and analysis, 
the Article proposes “predictive contracting,” a new method of 
contracting in which contract drafters can design contracts 
using a technology system that helps predict the connections 
between contract terms and outcomes. 
On July 25, 2018, the major technology company 
Qualcomm announced that it was walking away from its $44 
billion acquisition of NXP Semiconductors.3 Qualcomm and 
NXP had been working on closing the acquisition for almost 
two years.4 Qualcomm finally decided to terminate the deal 
after failing to receive regulatory approval from China.5 Yet 
despite Qualcomm’s best efforts to close the deal,6 it did not 
 
1 This Article uses the term “contract outcomes” to refer to a broad set 
of outcomes that can be used to assess a contract’s performance. This 
includes outcomes such as whether the contract resulted in litigation, the 
quality and timing of counterparty performance, how much the contract cost 
to draft and administer, etc. For a discussion of contract outcomes, see infra 
Section III.B.2. 
2 This Article uses the term “contract design” to collectively refer to the 
set of terms that make up a contract. See Albert Choi & George Triantis, 
The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design, 98 VA. L. REV. 1665, 
1665–69 (2012); Spencer Williams, Venture Capital Contract Design: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Connection Between Bargaining Power and 
Venture Financing Contract Terms, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 105, 106–
07 (2017). 
3 See Don Clark, Qualcomm Scraps $44 Billion NXP Deal After China 
Inaction, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/07/25/technology/qualcomm-nxp-china-deadline.html [https://perma. 
cc/8D52-7JLT]. 
4 See Chad Bray & Quentin Hardy, Qualcomm to Acquire NXP 
Semiconductors for $38.5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/business/dealbook/qualcomm-
acquire-nxp-semiconductors.html [https://perma.cc/7RDX-T85D]. 
5 See Clark, supra note 3. 
6 The CEOs of Qualcomm and NXP even exchanged text messages 
thanking each other for their work on the deal despite the end result. See 
Stu Woo, “I’m Sorry”: Qualcomm and NXP Chiefs Lament Failed Deal Via 
Texts, WALL ST. J. (July 26, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/qualcomm-
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get to walk away for free.7 Instead, it was forced to pay NXP 
a termination fee of $2 billion under a breakup provision in 
the acquisition agreement.8 
As the breakup provision in the Qualcomm-NXP example 
highlights, contract terms can have significant effects on 
outcomes for the parties involved. This is the case in business-
to-business contracts and business-to-consumer contracts.9 
For example, experimental evidence suggests that transfer 
provisions in mortgage contracts can increase the likelihood 
of homeowners engaging in strategic default10 and that 
parties are more likely to exploit efficient-breach 
opportunities if the contract contains a liquidated damages 
clause.11 In addition, empirical results show that anti-dilution 
mechanisms in venture capital contracts can alter the division 
of control between entrepreneurs and investors12 and that 
earnout clauses in complex acquisition agreements can have 
 
deal-collapse-forces-nxp-to-forge-a-new-path-1532600411 (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
7 See Clark, supra note 3. 
8 Id. 
9 While this Article focuses primarily on business-to-business 
contracts, it also highlights some important issues unique to business-to-
consumer contracts. For a categorization of contracts along these lines, see 
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003) (breaking contracts down into 
four categories based on whether the parties are businesses and/or 
individuals). 
10 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The 
Behavioral Economics of Strategic Default, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1547, 1573–74 
(2011). 
11 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage 
Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 633–38 (2010). 
12 Robert E. Hall & Susan E. Woodward, The Incentives to Start New 
Companies: Evidence from Venture Capital 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 13056, 2007) (finding that “[d]own-round 
anti-dilution provisions shift venture ownership upward and non-venture 
(entrepreneurs, angels, and employees) downward by an average of 4.8 
percentage points”). For a discussion of anti-dilution provisions, see Michael 
A. Woronoff & Jonathan A. Rosen, Understanding Anti-Dilution Provisions 
in Convertible Securities, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 140–55 (2005). 
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large effects on acquirer returns.13 Despite the importance of 
contract design to outcomes, little attention has been given to 
how contract drafters use historical outcomes to inform 
subsequent contract drafting. This is in sharp contrast to the 
focus on outcomes in other fields, such as medicine, 
engineering, philanthropy, and education.14 
The contracts literature has long been divided over how 
contract terms evolve over time. Efficient contracting theory 
takes the view that contract terms evolve via a market-based 
natural selection process.15 According to this view, the goal of 
contracting parties is to maximize the joint value created by 
 
13 See Leonidas Barbopoulos & Sudi Sudarsanam, Determinants of 
Earnout as Acquisition Payment Currency and Bidder’s Value Gains, 36 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 678, 678 (2012); Reena Kohli & Bikram Jit Singh Mann, 
Analyzing the Likelihood and Impact of Earnout Offers on Acquiring 
Company Wealth Gains in India, 16 EMERGING MKTS. REV. 203, 203 (2013). 
14 See generally PAUL BREST & HAL HARVEY, MONEY WELL SPENT: A 
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR SMART PHILANTHROPY 135–66 (2008) (highlighting the 
importance of measuring the return on philanthropic investments and 
using this information when making subsequent investment decisions); 
SIGURD SKOGESTAD & IAN POSTLETHWAITE, MULTIVARIABLE FEEDBACK 
CONTROL: ANALYSIS AND DESIGN (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the use of feedback 
mechanisms in systems engineering); Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman & 
Jonah E. Rockoff, Measuring the Impacts of Teachers II: Teacher Value-
Added and Student Outcomes in Adulthood, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 2633 (2014) 
(demonstrating that students who are taught by high value-added teachers 
have better outcomes in adulthood including higher rates of college 
attendance and higher salaries); Scott L. Pomeroy et al., Prediction of 
Central Nervous System Embryonal Tumour Outcome Based on Gene 
Expression, 415 NATURE 436 (2002) (showing that the clinical outcomes of 
children with embryonal tumors of the central nervous system known as 
medulloblastomas are highly predictable based on gene expression profiles). 
15 See Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of 
Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (2006); Charles J. 
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the 
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 
261, 278 (1985) (describing a “quasi-Darwinian evolutionary process” for 
contract terms); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and 
Innovation in Corporate Contracting, 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 760–61 (1997); 
Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of 
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 767, 787 (1995).  
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the contract.16 Over time, sub-optimal terms that do not 
maximize joint value are weeded out by value-maximizing 
contract drafters. This process leads to an optimal steady-
state contract design in which the terms of the contract 
efficiently maximize the joint value for the parties.17 Yet there 
is substantial scholarship that raises theoretical and 
empirical challenges to this natural selection view, citing 
examples of steady-state contracts that contain sub-optimal 
terms and/or are inefficiently incomplete.18 
 
16 See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 544, 552 (arguing that 
contracting parties aim to maximize joint value and that contract law 
should facilitate this value-maximization); Robert E. Scott & George G. 
Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 187, 188 (2005). 
17 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1–39 (1991); Marcel Kahan & Michael 
Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, 
Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 347 (1996). This view 
of contract design efficiency is a contractual application of the classic Coase 
Theorem that argues that with perfect information and no transaction costs, 
resources will be allocated efficiently regardless of initial allocation. See 
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–16 (1960). The 
term “steady state” refers to the state of a system that has reached 
equilibrium following an external shock. For a discussion of how contract 
terms respond to external shocks, see Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, 
Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of 
Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 933–36 (2004) (discussing how 
interpretive shocks can lead to changes in steady state contract terms and 
providing empirical evidence from sovereign bonds); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu 
Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1, 7–10, 27, 35–36 (2013) (proposing and testing a three-stage model of 
contract evolution that includes pre-shock standardization, post-shock 
innovation, and post-shock standardization). 
18 Frequently cited challenges to the efficient contracting theory 
include network and learning externalities, agency costs, cognitive biases 
and bounded rationality. See Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, Bounded 
Rationality and Incomplete Contracts, 58 RES. IN ECON. 3, 5 (2004) 
(describing how bounded rationality forces parties to write incomplete 
contracts); Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese”, 77 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 59, 60 (2001) (noting that iterations of contract forms do not 
always improve forms and sometimes make the form worse); Kahan & 
Klausner, supra note 17, at 350–64; Avery W. Katz, Contractual 
Incompleteness: A Transactional Perspective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 169, 
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As the above disagreement in the contracts literature 
highlights, contract drafters are impeded in their ability to 
iterate on contract design based on outcomes. This is partly 
due to two technical barriers long faced by contract drafters. 
First, contract drafters have traditionally had limited data on 
contract terms and outcomes.19 Most companies take an ad 
 
172–73 (2005); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form 
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2003) 
(arguing that due to bounded rationality, term-takers in the context of 
contracts of adhesion only consider a limited set of contract terms and 
therefore term-givers have an incentive to choose inefficient, allocatively 
favorable forms of the terms that are not considered); Russell Korobkin, 
Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of 
Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1586–87 (1998) 
(discussing an inertia theory of contract negotiation in which parties prefer 
previously used terms because of status quo and endowment bias); Russell 
Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 608 (1998); Barak Richman, Contracts Meet Henry Ford, 40 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 77, 78 (2014); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: 
The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548, 553–54 (1981) Kenneth 
A. Adams, Copyright and the Contract Drafter, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 23, 2006, at 
1–5 (discussing the difficulty of copyrighting novel contract terms). For an 
excellent example of empirical evidence that runs counter to the natural 
selection view of contract evolution, see MITU GULATI & ROBERT SCOTT, THE 
3 1/2 MINUTE TRANSACTION 2–3 (2012) (describing the continued widespread 
use of a “pari passu” clause in cross-border sovereign bond contracts 
following an adverse judicial ruling that upset the standing interpretation 
of the clause). As Gulati and Scott note, the pari passu clause continued to 
be used in ninety percent of sovereign bond contracts despite the adverse 
judicial interpretation. Id. In fact, use of the clause increased even as 
understanding of its meaning decreased. Id. at 141. 
19 See ANUJ SAXENA, ENTERPRISE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE TO SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTING AN ECM SOLUTION 11–12, 16–17 
(2008) (noting that most organizations manage contracts in an ad hoc 
manner, which results in numerous problems including fragmented 
contract data, poor visibility into contracts, ineffective contract monitoring, 
and inadequate analysis of contract performance); GULATI & SCOTT, supra 
note 18, at 4, 150 (identifying that the traditional structural division 
between litigation and transactional law practice prevents transactional 
lawyers from systematically modifying contract drafting based on litigation 
outcomes); Hill, supra note 18, at 75–76 (describing the tension between a 
contract as a document that meets the needs of the parties and a contract 
as a method of capturing data for future use); Matthew Roach, Toward a 
New Language of Legal Drafting, 17 J. HIGH TECH. L. 43, 46–48 (2016); 
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hoc approach to managing their contracts.20 In many cases, 
little or no contract data are collected in a systematic manner. 
When contract data are collected, these data rarely include 
contract outcomes such as whether a contract resulted in 
litigation.21 As a result, even if companies have data on the 
terms contained in their contracts, they cannot identify the 
effects of those terms on key outcomes without outcome data. 
Second, contract drafters have typically not had the analytical 
tools necessary to conduct robust analysis of contract data.22 
Many companies engage in low levels of systematic data 
analysis, or even forego the process entirely.23 Even if 
companies do engage in analysis of contract data, it is 
 
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract 
Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 822–23 (2006). 
20 See SAXENA, supra note 19, at 11–12. 
21 See Hill, supra note 18, at 69 (discussing how contract drafters lack 
the incentive to follow-up with a contract once it has been drafted and 
signed); George G. Triantis, Improving Contract Quality: Modularity, 
Technology, and Innovation in Contract Design, 18 STAN. J.L., BUS. & FIN. 
177, 183–84 (2013) (noting that contract drafters pay little attention to the 
consequences of contract drafting). 
22 See LAWRENCE S. MAISEL & GARY COKINS, PREDICTIVE BUSINESS 
ANALYTICS: FORWARD LOOKING CAPABILITIES TO IMPROVE BUSINESS 
PERFORMANCE 62 (2014) (citing studies regarding how companies frequently 
fail to engage in adequate analysis); GRETTA RUSANOW, KNOWLEDGE 
MANAGEMENT AND THE SMARTER LAWYER 346 (2003) (describing how contract 
drafters easily get overwhelmed when trying to process contract data); Peter 
J. Gardner, A Role for the Business Attorney in the Twenty-First Century: 
Adding Value to the Client’s Enterprise in the Knowledge Economy, 7 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 17, 44–45 (2003) (discussing the difficulty of 
processing large amounts of contract information in a meaningful way in a 
short amount of time); Hill, supra note 18, at 76 (discussing how “noise” in 
contract outcomes makes it difficult to determine the effects of terms on 
outcomes); Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—Or—How I 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future 
of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 928–29 (2013) (noting 
that even if lawyers had all the data they could ask for, it would be 
impossible for them to process these data using traditional mental heuristic 
models).  
23 See MAISEL & COKINS, supra note 22, at 62. 
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typically summarization of historical terms rather than 
prediction of future outcomes.24 
Recent technological developments in contract data 
collection and analysis are lowering the above barriers.25 
Building on these developments, this Article proposes 
“predictive contracting,” a new method of contracting in which 
contract drafters can design contracts using a technology 
system that helps predict the connections between contract 
terms and outcomes. For example, a predictive contracting 
system with data on the terms and outcomes of thousands of 
prior procurement contracts could inform a contract drafter 
that version A of a delivery term is ten percent more likely to 
result in late performance by a particular type of counterparty 
than version B. Predictive contracting will be powered by 
machine learning26 and draw on contract data obtained from 
integrated contract management systems,27 natural language 
processing,28 and computable contracts.29 Initially, predictive 
contracting will be applied to relatively simple, high volume 
contracts, such as sales and nondisclosure agreements. As 
predictive contracting systems improve over time, they can 
begin to be applied to more complex contracts, such as 
financing and acquisition agreements. Unlike previous 
 
24 Id. at 5. 
25 In the words of Oliver Williamson, “[b]ut for the limited ability of 
human agents to receive, store, retrieve and process data, interesting 
economic problems vanish.” Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost 
Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 
234 n.5 (1979). 
26 Machine learning is a category of artificial intelligence research that 
focuses on building mathematical computer models that learn from data to 
improve over time. See infra Section II.A. 
27 Contract management refers to a broad category of workflow 
processes and technology systems that allow companies to track and 
manage their contracts from beginning to end. See infra Section II.C.1. 
28 Natural language processing is a category of machine learning 
research focused on enabling computers to understand natural language 
communication, such as documents written in English. See infra Section 
II.C.2. 
29 A contract is computable if it is both machine-readable and machine-
executable. See infra Section II.C.3. 
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contract automation mechanisms, such as LegalZoom, that 
have primarily focused on making contracts cheaper and 
faster to draft,30 predictive contracting aims to substantively 
improve contract design by statistically connecting terms to 
outcomes. 
This Article makes both theoretical and practical 
contributions to the contracts literature. On a theoretical 
level, predictive contracting can lead to greater customization, 
increased innovation, more complete contract design, more 
effective balancing of front-end and back-end costs, better risk 
assessment and allocation, and more accurate term pricing for 
negotiation. On a practical level, predictive contracting has 
the potential to significantly alter the role of transactional 
lawyers by providing them with access to previously 
unavailable information on the statistical connections 
between contract terms and outcomes. In addition to these 
theoretical and practical contributions, the Article also 
anticipates and addresses limitations and risks of predictive 
contracting, including technical constraints, concerns 
regarding data privacy and confidentiality, the regulation of 
the unauthorized practice of law, and the potential for 
exacerbating information inequality. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II 
introduces predictive contracting, discusses and provides 
examples of the underlying technologies, and distinguishes 
predictive contracting from prior versions of contract 
automation. Part III discusses the theoretical and practical 
implications of predictive contracting and addresses 
limitations and risks. The Article ends with a short conclusion 
that discusses opportunities for further research. 
 
30 See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 6 (citing an interview with a 
transactional lawyer in which the lawyer describes how contract 
automation technology allows an associate to draft a sovereign bond 
contract in only three and a half minutes); Triantis, supra note 21, at 179 
(discussing how contract automation has focused on commoditizing 
transactional legal work with the goal of cutting costs rather than 
improving contract quality).  
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II. PREDICTIVE CONTRACTING 
This Part introduces predictive contracting, discusses and 
provides examples of the underlying technologies, and 
distinguishes predictive contracting from previous versions of 
contract automation. Predictive contracting is a new method 
of contracting in which contract drafters can design contracts 
using a technology system that helps predict the connections 
between contract terms and outcomes given a set of exogenous 
conditions. Figure 1 depicts predictive contracting. 
 
Figure 1: Predictive Contracting31 
 
 
 
 
31 The total number of variables for terms, conditions and outcomes 
(represented by the subscripts x, y, and z) do not need to be equal. For 
example, a predictive contracting scenario could contain three terms, ten 
exogenous conditions, and two outcomes. 
2019.2_WILLIAMS_FINAL 4/27/2019 4:19 AM 
632 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
As can be seen in Figure 1, contract terms result in 
contract outcomes given a set of exogenous conditions.32 The 
goal of predictive contracting is to help contract drafters 
predict how terms are connected to outcomes given specified 
conditions. Contract drafters can then use this information to 
iteratively improve contract design over time. 
A hypothetical example of predictive contracting can be 
illustrative. In this example, assume a company enters into 
simple sales contracts with its customers. One of the terms in 
the template sales contract is a choice of law provision 
between State A and State B. Looking to gain insights into the 
effects of this choice of law provision, the company compiles a 
data set of numerous past sales contracts. This data set 
contains data on (1) whether a contract used State A or State 
B for the choice of law provision, (2) whether the contract 
resulted in arbitration and if so the costs associated with the 
arbitration, and (3) a variety of exogenous conditions 
including demographic data on the counterparty. The 
company then uses this data to build a predictive contracting 
model to see if the choice of law provision has an impact on 
the likelihood and costliness of arbitration. The model 
identifies that for a specific category of counterparty, State A 
reduces overall arbitration costs, but for all other 
counterparties, State B reduces arbitration costs. The 
company uses this insight to set State B as the default for the 
choice of law provision except when dealing with this 
particular type of counterparty, thereby reducing overall 
arbitration costs. 
As the example shows, a predictive contracting system is 
comprised of two primary technical components: (1) an 
analytical model and (2) a data set of contract terms, outcomes 
and exogenous conditions. These components are addressed in 
the Sections below. As these Sections will demonstrate, the 
individual technical components of predictive contracting 
 
32 In most cases, outcomes will result probabilistically from terms and 
exogenous conditions, though in some instances the association may be 
determinative. For a discussion of how contract outcomes result 
probabilistically from external contingencies and conditional instructions 
contained within a contract, see GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 143. 
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already exist and are currently being used in a variety of other 
real-world contexts. The existence of these technologies 
supports the technical feasibility of predictive contracting. 
The Sections below provide examples of these technologies 
and discuss how they will facilitate predictive contracting. 
Predictive contracting systems will likely come in two 
forms: (1) systems built by third-party technology companies 
that are sold as software solutions to customers, and (2) 
systems built in-house by large companies. Third-party 
predictive contracting systems will primarily be marketed to 
small and midsized companies. While most of these companies 
will not have an incentive to develop predictive contracting on 
their own due to relatively low contracting volume, third-
party technology providers can overcome this incentive 
problem by selling predictive contracting systems to multiple 
small and midsized customers. In addition, technology 
providers will be able to supply the complex technical 
expertise needed to develop a predictive contracting system 
that small-to-midsized companies may lack. This pattern is 
already observable in the contract management industry.33 
Large companies, on the other hand, will likely have sufficient 
contracting volume to be incentivized to develop predictive 
contracting in-house and the resources to do so. In both cases, 
predictive contracting systems will be designed such that 
contract drafters can use them without a background in 
statistics or computer science. 
Predictive contracting will initially be applied to relatively 
simple, high-volume contracts, such as sales and 
nondisclosure agreements. In addition, predictive contracting 
systems will begin by examining relatively narrow problem 
specifications with a limited number of terms, outcomes, and 
exogenous conditions. This is because the ability of a model to 
predict outcomes of a system decreases as the complexity of 
the system increases.34 Furthermore, the predictive capability 
of a model generally increases as the amount of data the model 
has access to increases. Therefore, examining narrow 
 
33 See infra Section II.C.1. 
34 See Katz, supra note 22, at 959–63. 
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problems related to simple contracts with large amounts of 
data is an ideal starting point for early versions of predictive 
contracting. As predictive contracting models improve and 
contract data becomes more robust, contract drafters can 
begin to use predictive contracting to analyze broader 
problems and more complex contracts such as financing and 
acquisition agreements. 
The remainder of this Part proceeds as follows. Section II.A 
discusses the predictive contracting model, Section II.B 
examines the necessary types of contract data, Section II.C 
discusses potential sources of these data, and Section II.D 
distinguishes predictive contracting from prior versions of 
contract automation.  
A. Model 
The predictive contracting model is the analytical 
mechanism that uses contract data to provide contract 
drafters with insights into the statistical connections between 
contract terms and outcomes given exogenous conditions. To 
build a predictive contracting model, developers are likely to 
rely heavily on a rapidly growing area of analytical 
innovation: machine learning. Machine learning is a category 
of artificial intelligence research that focuses on building 
mathematical computer models that learn from data to 
improve over time.35 Unlike earlier versions of artificial 
intelligence that attempted to replicate the way the human 
mind learns, machine learning instead seeks to achieve 
analytical results by using data-driven statistical models 
powered by computer processors.36 Machine learning models 
 
35 See Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 
89 (2014). 
36 See id. at 95–100; see also Katz, supra note 22, at 913–18 (discussing 
how the increase in data-driven predictive analysis is made possible in part 
due to the continually increasing power of computer processors described by 
Moore’s Law and the continually decreasing cost of data storage described 
by Kryder’s Law). For a discussion of Moore’s Law, see Gordon E. Moore, 
Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits, 38 ELECTRONICS 114 
(1965). For a discussion of Kryder’s Law, see Chip Walter, Kryder’s Law, 
SCI. AM., Aug. 2005, at 32. 
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have two main advantages over alternative analytical 
methods such as causal inference. First, machine learning 
models improve over time as more data are added to the data 
set from which the model learns, which is known as the 
“training set.”37 Second, machine learning models do not 
necessarily require a pre-specified relationship between 
independent and dependent variables.38 This “black box” 
approach allows machine learning models to provide valuable 
predictive insights without the user needing to specify (or 
even understand) the potential relationships between 
variables in the model.39 
Thus far, machine learning in the legal industry has 
primarily been applied to litigation issues such as discovery,40 
legal search,41 the setting of bail,42 and even jury selection.43 
Perhaps the most interesting application of machine learning 
to the law (and the most relevant for predictive contracting) 
has been the prediction of case outcomes and judicial 
decisions.44 Previously an academic endeavor, multiple 
 
37 See Surden, supra note 35, at 92–93. 
38 See Katz, supra note 22, at 949–53. 
39 Id. While machine learning models do not necessarily require the 
user to prespecify a relationship between the variables in the model, the 
user must still select the data upon which the model is trained. For a 
discussion of the risks associated with the “black box” nature of machine 
learning models, see infra Section III.C.1. 
40 See Katz, supra note 22, at 945; John O. McGinnis & Russell G. 
Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will Transform the 
Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 
3047–48 (2014); Mark McKamey, Legal Technology: Artificial Intelligence 
and the Future of Law Practice, 22 APPEAL 45, 49 (2017). 
41 See McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 40, at 3048–50. 
42 See Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and 
Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401, 1428 (2017). 
43 See Social-Enriched Voir Dire, VIJILENT, https://www.vijilent.com/ 
jury-selection [https://perma.cc/QDP5-WRNJ]; VOLTAIRE, https://voltaire 
app.com [https://perma.cc/NG3R-A5PM]. Voltaire is a technology system for 
jury selection that is powered by machine learning. See id. 
44 See Katz, supra note 22, at 936–39; Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. 
Quinn, Theodore W. Ruger & Pauline T. Kim, Competing Approaches to 
Predicting Supreme Court Decision Making, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 761, 761 
(2004); McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 40, at 3052–53; Theodore W. Ruger, 
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companies45 are now using machine learning to engage in case 
prediction.46 Notable among these companies is Judicata.47 
Judicata has built a machine learning prediction model 
trained on publicly available case law and opinions.48 Users 
upload court documents for analysis such as motions and 
briefs as well as contextual information, such as the cause of 
action, the identity of the judge, and the location of the court.49 
Judicata analyzes the document and generates a report that 
assess the document in three categories: drafting, arguments, 
and context.50 With respect to drafting, Judicata analyzes the 
document’s citations and quotes for errors and potentially 
 
Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The Supreme Court 
Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting 
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1151–59 (2004); 
Surden, supra note 35, at 108–10; Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots 
Be Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law 30 (Nov. 27, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2701092 [https://perma.cc/W5TY-EC28]; Daniel Martin Katz, 
Michael J. Bommarito II & Josh Blackman, A General Approach for 
Predicting the Behavior of the Supreme Court of the United States, PLOS 
ONE (Apr. 12, 2017), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371 
/journal.pone.0174698 [https://perma.cc/JMQ4-EG48].  
45 Much of this section is based on interviews conducted by the author, 
which are cited throughout. These individuals spoke on conditions of 
anonymity and therefore, out of respect for their privacy, names are omitted 
from the citations. Notes from each interview are on file with the Columbia 
Business Law Review.  
46 See, e.g., LEXMACHINA, https://lexmachina.com [https://perma 
.cc/F37M-B6G2]; PREMONITION, https://premonition.ai [https://perma. 
cc/WFS3-8837]; RAVEL, http://ravellaw.com [https://perma.cc/4AHT-VHVB]. 
47 See JUDICATA, https://www.judicata.com [https://perma.cc/2PZP-
3T6A]; see also Itai Gurari, From Judging Lawyers to Predicting Outcomes, 
OFFICIAL JUDICATA BLOG (Feb. 6, 2018), https://blog.judicata.com/from-
judging-lawyers-to-predicting-outcomes-f46aedeb8684 (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review); Beth Hoover, Judge Insights: 
Understanding the Forest and the Trees, OFFICIAL JUDICATA BLOG (June 28, 
2017), https://blog.judicata.com/judge-insights-understanding-the-forest-
and-the-trees-c3164b767a4c (on file with the Columbia Business Law 
Review). 
48 Telephone Interview with Judicata Representatives (Apr. 2, 2018).  
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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recommends better sources.51 With respect to arguments, the 
system breaks the document down into its constituent 
arguments and displays the statistical favorability of those 
arguments based on past cases.52 The system can also 
recommend missing arguments that it believes should be in 
the document.53 Lastly, with respect to context, Judicata will 
provide the user with information on the outcomes of past 
cases with similar contextual characteristics.54 In the future, 
the company plans to enable the system to generate first 
drafts of litigation documents.55 
Machine learning is also beginning to be applied in the 
contracting context. Numerous contract technology companies 
are leveraging machine learning to provide contract drafters 
with insightful analysis. Contract Standards56 and Legal 
Robot57 are using machine learning to enhance compliance 
efforts by creating a map of a contract’s constituent parts that 
can be connected with a map of an area of regulation to 
determine if there are any regulatory conflicts.58 Legal 
technology companies are also using machine learning for 
predictive analysis. For example, Kira Systems59 is working 
on a machine learning model for risk prediction in corporate 
acquisitions.60 Contract drafters would be able to use this 
model to identify the likelihood of litigation risk associated 
 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 CONTRACT STANDARDS, https://www.contractstandards.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/8LAG-CEH5]. 
57 LEGAL ROBOT, https://www.legalrobot.com/ [https://perma.cc/VP2F-
HYMG]. 
58 Telephone Interview with Contract Standards Representative (Mar. 
6, 2018); Telephone Interview with Legal Robot Representative (Mar. 14, 
2018). Contract Standards has mapped HIPAA and Legal Robot has 
mapped regulatory changes pertaining to Brexit, the United Kingdom’s exit 
from the European Union. 
59 KIRA, https://kirasystems.com/ [https://perma.cc/P4UD-S4G3]. 
60 Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative (Mar. 12, 
2018). 
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with specific terms in acquisition agreements based on data of 
past agreements and litigation.61 
A predictive contracting system using a machine learning 
model would function as follows. First, a predictive 
contracting technology provider (or a group within a large 
company building a predictive contracting system) would 
compile a data set of contract terms, outcomes, and exogenous 
conditions.62 This data set would serve as the training set for 
the machine learning model. The predictive contracting 
company would then train a model based on this data set that 
would identify connections between terms and outcomes of 
interest given a set of exogenous conditions. Contract drafters 
would then use this information to inform contract design 
when drafting subsequent contracts. Data on the terms, 
outcomes, and conditions associated with these subsequent 
contracts would be collected and periodically added to the 
training set to retrain the model.63 As the data set expands 
over time, the model would become more powerful and 
therefore able to take on more complex prediction problems. 
Building a machine learning model for a predictive 
contracting system will require real-world contract data and 
is beyond the scope of this Article. While there are numerous 
standard machine learning models available for prediction 
analysis,64 the design of a predictive contracting model will 
 
61 Id. 
62 For a discussion of these different types of data, see infra Section 
II.B. For a discussion of potential sources of these data, see infra Section 
II.C. 
63 This is similar to how insurance companies use actuarial data to 
update the terms and conditions of insurance contracts. See Boardman, 
supra note 15, at 1114–16 (“Not only does past language become clearer over 
time in the insurer’s eyes, but the cost of each clause becomes increasingly 
clear as actuarial data is collected and pooled.”). 
64 For example, IBM offers off-the-shelf machine learning software 
through its Watson initiative. See Watson Machine Learning, IBM, 
https://www.ibm.com/cloud/machine-learning [https://perma.cc/6J2S-
59E4]. Common machine learning models include support vector machines 
and random forest decision trees. Support vector machines are commonly 
used in classification problems to sort data into defined categories. See 
generally COLIN CAMPBELL & YIMING YING, LEARNING WITH SUPPORT VECTOR 
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depend in large part on the characteristics of the contracting 
problem being analyzed. Two key dimensions of any predictive 
contracting model will be: (1) whether the model is single-task 
or multi-task, and (2) whether the model is supervised or 
unsupervised. These dimensions are discussed in the Sections 
below. 
1. Single-Task vs. Multi-Task 
Single-task machine learning models are ideal for 
scenarios in which the objective of the model is to solve a 
single learning task.65 In the context of predictive contracting, 
single-task learning will be effective when the outcomes being 
predicted are largely independent from one another.66 For 
example, assume that a contract drafter wants to understand 
how a variety of contract terms and exogenous conditions 
affect two outcomes: the amount of drafting time spent 
obtaining internal approvals and the quality of service 
provided by the counterparty under the contract. These 
outcomes are unlikely to be related, so the contract drafter 
could use two separate single-task learning models to predict 
each outcome. The type of single-task model that is most 
effective will depend on factors such as the amount of data in 
the training set and whether the outcome variable is binary, 
categorical, or numerical.67 
Multi-task machine learning models, on the other hand, 
are better suited for scenarios in which multiple learning 
 
MACHINES (2011); NELLO CRISTIANINI & JOHN SHAWE-TAYLOR, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINES AND OTHER KERNEL-BASED 
LEARNING METHODS (2000); INGO STEINWART & ANDREAS CHRISTMANN, 
SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINES (2008). Random forests use a series of decision 
trees to analyze classification and regression problems. See generally Tin 
Kam Ho, Random Decision Forests, 1 PROC. 3RD INT’L CONF. ON DOCUMENT 
ANALYSIS & RECOGNITION 278, 278–82 (1995); Leo Breiman, Random 
Forests, 45 MACHINE LEARNING 5 (2001); Tao Shi & Steve Horvath, 
Unsupervised Learning with Random Forest Predictors, 15 J. 
COMPUTATIONAL & GRAPHICAL STATS. 118, 118 (2006). 
65 Interview with Private Technology Company Representative, in S.F., 
Cal. (May 2, 2018). 
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
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tasks need to be solved at the same time.68 Multi-task 
learning draws on similarities and differences between the 
different learning tasks to improve efficiency and accuracy.69 
In the context of predictive contracting, multi-task learning 
will be useful when the outcomes being predicted are related 
to one another.70 In the previous example, assume instead 
that the contract drafter wants to predict both the likelihood 
that the counterparty renews the contract and the likelihood 
that the contract results in litigation. These outcomes are 
likely to be related (a counterparty is less likely to renew a 
contract that resulted in litigation), so the contract drafter 
could use a multi-task learning model to predict both 
outcomes. Multi-task learning will frequently utilize an 
artificial neural network (often called a “neural net”), a 
machine learning mechanism commonly used in image 
recognition.71 
2. Supervised vs. Unsupervised 
Supervised machine learning models learn from a training 
set of labeled data.72 For example, a supervised model 
 
68 See generally Andreas Argyriou, Theodoros Evgeniou & 
Massimiliano Pontil, Convex Multi-Task Feature Learning, 73 MACHINE 
LEARNING 243 (2008); Rich Caruana, Multitask Learning, 28 MACHINE 
LEARNING 41 (1997); Carlo Ciliberto, Youssef Mroueh, Tomaso Poggio & 
Lorenzo Rosasco, Convex Learning of Multiple Tasks and Their Structure 1 
(Apr. 17, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/1504.03101 
[https://perma.cc/NW2K-JJJ3]. 
69 See supra note 68. 
70 Interview with Private Technology Company Representative, supra 
note 65. 
71 Id. See generally SIMON HAYKIN, NEURAL NETWORKS AND LEARNING 
MACHINES (3d ed. 2009); Jürgen Schmidhuber, Deep Learning in Neural 
Networks: An Overview, 61 NEURAL NETWORKS 85 (2015).  
72 See MEHRYAR MOHRI, AFSHIN ROSTAMIZADEH & AMEET TALWALKAR, 
FOUNDATIONS OF MACHINE LEARNING (2012); STUART RUSSELL & PETER 
NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2010); 
Surden, supra note 35, at 93; Irene Ng (Huang Ying), The Art of Contract 
Drafting in the Age of Artificial Intelligence: A Comparative Study Based on 
US, UK and Austrian Law 25 (Transatlantic Tech. L.F. Working Paper No. 
26, 2017); Remus & Levy, supra note 44, at 9–10.  
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designed to identify whether an image contains an apple 
would be trained on a data set of images that a human had 
gone through ahead of time and tagged which ones contained 
apples. Based on this labeled data, the model would learn to 
identify the image characteristics of an apple. In the 
predictive contracting context, a supervised model would be 
trained on labeled data of contract terms and outcomes. For 
example, a supervised predictive contracting model designed 
to identify connections between anti-dilution provisions in 
venture financing agreements and entrepreneur ownership at 
liquidation would be trained on a data set of contracts labeled 
with their type of anti-dilution provision and the percent of 
entrepreneur ownership at liquidation. The necessity of data 
labeling for supervised learning emphasizes the importance of 
collecting contract data that are properly formatted and 
structured for use in machine learning. Part II.C below 
discusses potential means of collecting contract data in this 
manner. 
Unsupervised machine learning models, on the other hand, 
learn from unlabeled data.73 In the apple image recognition 
example above, an unsupervised model would be provided 
with a data set of unlabeled images, some containing apples, 
some not. In the predictive contracting context, an example of 
unlabeled data would be a contract in Microsoft Word or PDF 
format with none of its terms labeled ahead of time by a 
human. Because unsupervised models do not require labeled 
data, they are well-suited for situations in which labeling data 
is difficult or impossible. Yet unsupervised models can prove 
less effective than supervised models in situations in which 
the user is interested in identifying connections between 
specific inputs and outputs because these inputs and outputs 
are not pre-defined by the user. For predictive contracting, if 
a contract drafter is interested in understanding the 
connections between a specific term or set of terms and a 
 
73 See UNSUPERVISED LEARNING: FOUNDATIONS OF NEURAL 
COMPUTATION (Geoffrey Hinton & Terrence J. Sejnowski eds., 1999); 
RICHARD O. DUDA, PETER HART & DAVID G. STORK, PATTERN CLASSIFICATION 
517–600 (2d ed. 2001); Ng, supra note 72, at 25–26; Remus & Levy, supra 
note 44, at 10–11. 
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defined set of outcomes, a supervised model would likely prove 
more effective. As a result, early versions of predictive 
contracting will likely rely more heavily on supervised 
learning due to initial applications of predictive contracting 
being relatively specific and narrow in scope. As predictive 
contracting expands in scope to address more complex 
relationships between terms and outcomes, developers may 
turn to unsupervised learning. 
B. Data 
A predictive contracting system running on machine 
learning technology as discussed in Part II.A will require the 
following three categories of contract data: (1) terms, (2) 
outcomes, and (3) exogenous conditions. These data categories 
are discussed in the Sections below. 
1. Terms 
The first category of data needed for predictive contracting 
is data on contract terms. In the relationship depicted in 
Figure 1, terms are the endogenous inputs that, when 
combined with exogenous conditions, result in contract 
outcomes. Terms are endogenous to the relationship between 
the contracting parties because the parties chose to include 
the terms in the contract. This is true even of non-negotiated, 
boilerplate terms because the parties ultimately chose to enter 
into a contract containing these terms. As a result, contract 
terms are considered endogenous for the purposes of 
predictive contracting even in the case of consumer contracts 
of adhesion in which consumers are faced with “take-it-or-
leave-it” contracting scenarios.74 While contract design also 
 
74 See generally Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer 
Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749 (2008); Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric 
Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge That Is Yet to Be Met, 
45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723 (2008); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some 
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Michael 
I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics 
Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583 (1990); Andrew A. Schwartz, 
Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of Adhesion, 28 YALE J. ON 
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includes implied terms that are not expressly included in the 
contract but are inferred by courts in the event of litigation, 
these terms are difficult to incorporate into predictive 
contracting because data on them cannot be collected from 
contract documents like express terms.75 
Contract terms can be analyzed as individual terms or as 
sets of multiple terms. The modular nature of contracts lends 
itself to breaking contracts down into their constituent 
terms.76 For example, a contract could be broken down into 
Terms A, B, C, D, and E. A contract drafter could then use a 
predictive contracting system to analyze the effects of each of 
these terms on outcomes of interest given a set of exogenous 
conditions. Recent research, however, has highlighted the 
importance of the interconnectedness of contract terms to 
overall contract design.77 In the previous example, the 
contract drafter could also use predictive contracting to 
analyze the joint effects of subsets of Terms A–E on the 
outcomes of interest. 
Contract term data can broadly be classified as binary, 
categorical, or numerical.78 Binary term data can be used to 
represent the presence or absence of a term in a contract. For 
example, a contract data set could contain binary data on 
whether or not an acquisition agreement contained an 
earnout provision. Binary term data is most useful for 
 
REG. 313 (2011); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and 
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971); Anne 
Brafford, Note, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: 
Fair Play or Trap for the Weak and Unwary?, 21 J. CORP. L. 331 (1996). For 
a discussion of the implications of predictive contracting for consumer 
contracts, see infra Section III.C.4. 
75 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 15, at 262. For a discussion of issues 
raised by terms and conditions that are difficult to capture, see infra Section 
III.C.1. 
76 See Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement 
Dealmaking in Complex Mergers and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 
1417–27 (2016) (discussing the modularity of merger and acquisition 
contracts). 
77 See Cathy Hwang & Matthew Jennejohn, Deal Structure, NW. U. L. 
REV. 279, 279–85 (2018). 
78 This is also true of outcome and condition data. 
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examining the effects of terms for which there is little or no 
variation in the form of the term across contracts other than 
whether the term is present or absent. Categorical term data 
can be used to represent different versions of a term.79 For 
example, a contract data set could contain categorical term 
data on the type of anti-dilution provision contained in a 
venture financing agreement. Categories of terms can be 
ordered or unordered. Ordered categories represent a logical 
progression between the categories, such as different versions 
of a penalty term with increasing levels of severity. 
Categorical term data is most useful for examining the effects 
of terms for which there is meaningful variation in the form of 
the term across contracts. Numerical term data can be used to 
represent terms with magnitude. For example, a contract data 
set could contain numerical data on the interest rate in a debt 
contract or the price in a procurement contract. 
2. Outcomes 
The second category of data needed for predictive 
contracting is data on contract outcomes. In the relationship 
depicted in Figure 1, outcomes are the outputs that result 
from endogenous contract terms and exogenous conditions. 
Contract outcomes are a means of assessing and measuring a 
contract. Predictive contracting aims to help contract drafters 
understand and predict the effects of terms on outcomes given 
conditions so that drafters can design subsequent contracts 
that result in better outcomes. The improvement of contract 
outcomes is therefore the ultimate goal of predictive 
contracting. In most contracting scenarios, parties and their 
drafters will have to balance certain expected outcomes 
against others when designing a contract. This aspect of 
contract design will become a key role for transactional 
lawyers in the presence of predictive contracting.80 
 
79 Note that for categorical term data, one of the versions of a term 
could be the absence of the term. 
80 See infra Section III.B. 
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Contract outcomes can assess both the front-end and back-
end of a contract’s life.81 The front-end is when the parties and 
their agents negotiate and design the contract. Examples of 
front-end outcomes include how long the contract took to 
negotiate and how much the contract cost to draft. The back-
end is when the parties perform the obligations under the 
contract and/or potentially dispute the contract. Examples of 
back-end outcomes include the timing and quality of 
counterparty performance and whether the contract resulted 
in litigation. Contract outcomes can also be objective or 
subjective. Examples of objective outcomes include whether 
the contract was amended and the amount of any payments 
made under the contract. Examples of subjective outcomes 
include whether the parties believed the contract adequately 
met their needs and whether the contract resulted in any 
reputational effects for the parties.  
Predictive contracting users will likely use a wide variety 
of outcomes to assess their contracts, including front-end, 
back-end, objective, and subjective outcomes.82 While many 
outcomes will be specific to the contracting scenario being 
analyzed, some general outcomes of interest include: 
 
• The amount of time to negotiate and draft the 
contract 
 
81 See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract 
Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 851 (2010); 
Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1583–84 (2005); Scott & Triantis, supra note 19, at 814; 
Scott & Triantis, supra note 16, at 190. For a proposed model that includes 
a third “midstream” stage, see Triantis, supra note 21, at 183–84. 
82 See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. 
L. REV. 1129, 1158 (2006) (discussing how contracting parties balance 
several goals when designing a contract); D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. 
King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2009) (applying 
organization theory to contracts to argue that contracts are strategically 
important mechanisms that enable an organization to advance its strategic 
goals); Ron Dolin, Measuring Legal Quality 2 (June 18, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2988647 
[https://perma.cc/WX5D-AHLD ] (citing an example of DuPont developing a 
diverse set of assessment outcomes for analyzing its litigation portfolio).  
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• The cost to negotiate and draft the contract 
• The extent of deviation between the first draft and 
the final draft 
• The timing of counterparty performance 
• The quality of counterparty performance 
• Whether and how the contract was amended 
• Whether and why the contract resulted in a dispute 
• If the contract resulted in a dispute, how the 
dispute was resolved (negotiation, arbitration, 
litigation, etc.) 
• If the contract resulted in a dispute, the cost of the 
dispute 
• The total cost of negotiating, drafting, 
administering, and resolving the contract 
• Whether the parties were satisfied with the 
contract 
• Whether the contract resulted in any reputational 
effects for the parties 
3. Conditions 
The third category of data needed for predictive 
contracting is data on exogenous conditions. In the 
relationship depicted in Figure 1, conditions are the 
exogenous inputs that, when combined with endogenous 
terms, result in contract outcomes. Contracting does not exist 
in a vacuum, but rather against a backdrop of external factors 
that can influence contract design and outcomes.83 For 
example, whether the parties to an acquisition agreement are 
public or private can have substantial effects on the design of 
the agreement and numerous outcomes of interest. While 
some insights could be gained from a predictive contracting 
model trained only on terms and outcomes, the quality of the 
 
83 See Williams, supra note 2, at 149–54 (demonstrating that the total 
supply of venture capital financing had statistically significant connections 
with a variety of contract terms based on a set of over 5000 venture capital 
financing contracts from 2004–2015). The author controlled for a number of 
other external factors such as industry, location, and the risk-free treasury 
rate. See id. at 151–53. 
2019.2_WILLIAMS_FINAL 4/27/2019 4:19 AM 
No. 1:621] PREDICTIVE CONTRACTING 647 
results generated by the model can be improved by including 
data on relevant exogenous conditions.84  
For the purposes of predictive contracting, a condition is 
considered exogenous if one or more of the parties cannot 
feasibly modify it as part of the contract design process. This 
includes conditions over which the parties have no control, 
such as general economic conditions and geopolitical factors. 
This also includes conditions over which the parties do have 
control but cannot feasibly modify as part of the contracting 
scenario being analyzed. For example, while the location of a 
party’s headquarters may be a relevant condition for a simple 
procurement contract, and while the party does have control 
over this condition, it cannot feasibly move its headquarters 
for the purposes of designing the contract. As a result, the 
location of the party’s headquarters would be considered an 
exogenous condition when analyzing the procurement 
contract using a predictive contracting system. 
While many conditions will be specific to the contracting 
scenario being analyzed, some general conditions include: 
 
• Party characteristics (identity, location, size, 
industry, etc.) 
• Drafter characteristics (identity, location, law firm, 
etc.) 
• Whether the parties have a preexisting relationship 
and the nature of that relationship 
• Whether the contract is based on a prior contract 
between the parties 
• General industry conditions 
• General economic conditions 
• Geopolitical conditions 
 
84 Determining which exogenous conditions are “relevant” will require 
iterative trial and error. Contract drafters will initially include exogenous 
conditions for which they have data and believe could potentially influence 
design and/or outcomes. The models they develop will then provide insight 
into whether those conditions are in fact relevant. 
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C. Data Sources 
Data on contract terms, outcomes, and conditions for use 
in predictive contracting will primarily come from three 
sources: (1) contract management systems, (2) natural 
language processing, and (3) computable contracts. These 
data sources are discussed in the Sections below. 
1. Contract Management 
Contract management refers to a broad category of 
workflow processes and technology systems that allow 
companies to track and manage their contracts from 
beginning to end.85 While many companies still manage their 
contracts through a combination of email and Excel 
spreadsheets, a growing percentage of companies are turning 
to dedicated contract management systems.86 Contract 
management systems include both systems developed in-
house for use by a single company,87 as well as third-party 
contract management providers that sell contract 
management software to a wide range of customers.88 While 
many companies still use contract management systems 
primarily as repositories for contract documents, a growing 
 
85 See SAXENA, supra note 19, at 12 (“Enterprise Contract Management 
(ECM) encompasses a wide spectrum of applications, protocols, and systems 
for managing an enterprise’s contracts from A to Z.”). 
86 In a 2017 survey by SpringCM, thirty-two percent of respondents 
reported that they manage their contracts with a contract management tool. 
See MATT STERN, SPRINGCM, 2017 STATE OF CONTRACT MANAGEMENT REPORT 
9 (2017) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
87 Interview with Oracle Representative, in S.F., Cal. (Apr. 10, 2018); 
Telephone Interview with Airbnb Representatives (Apr. 26, 2018); 
Telephone Interview with Microsoft Representatives (Apr. 12, 2018); 
Telephone Interview with Public Technology Company Representative 
(Apr. 30, 2018). 
88 For a list of some of the primary contract management providers, see 
Contract Management Software, CAPTERRA, https://www.capterra.com/ 
contract-management-software [https://perma.cc/9E2Z-G2FA]. 
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number of companies are starting to use these systems as data 
sources for a variety of applications.89 
Contract management systems increase the availability of 
data on contract terms. Companies use contract management 
systems to track data on key terms as well as conditions such 
as party identities, locations, and dates.90 Companies will 
often begin the contracting process with an internal 
template.91 Contract drafters will negotiate the template-
based contract with the counterparty based on a set of pre-
approved negotiating ranges for various terms.92 Any 
modifications that fall outside these pre-approved ranges 
must typically go through an internal approval process.93 
Once the contract has been finalized, contract drafters can 
track any deviations from the template terms in the contract 
 
89 See Andrew Bartels & Charlotte Wang, The Forrester WaveTM: 
Contract Life-Cycle Management, Q3 2016, FORRESTER, July 25, 2016, at 2–
3 (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
90 Interview with Oracle Representative, supra note 87; Telephone 
Interview with Airbnb Representative, supra note 87; Telephone Interview 
with Dell Representative (Apr. 11, 2018); Telephone Interview with 
Microsoft Representatives, supra note 87; Telephone Interview with Private 
Technology Company Representative (Apr. 13, 2018); Telephone Interview 
with Public Technology Company Representative, supra note 87. 
91 Interview with Oracle Representative, supra note 87; Telephone 
Interview with Airbnb Representative, supra note 87; Telephone Interview 
with Dell Representative, supra note 90; Telephone Interview with 
Microsoft Representatives, supra note 87; Telephone Interview with Private 
Technology Company Representative, supra note 90; Telephone Interview 
with Public Technology Company Representative, supra note 87. 
92 Interview with Oracle Representative, supra note 87; Telephone 
Interview with Airbnb Representative, supra note 87; Telephone Interview 
with Dell Representative, supra note 90; Telephone Interview with 
Microsoft Representatives, supra note 87; Telephone Interview with Private 
Technology Company Representative, supra note 90; Telephone Interview 
with Public Technology Company Representative, supra note 87. 
93 Interview with Oracle Representative, supra note 87; Telephone 
Interview with Airbnb Representative, supra note 87; Telephone Interview 
with Dell Representative, supra note 90; Telephone Interview with 
Microsoft Representatives, supra note 87; Telephone Interview with Public 
Technology Company Representative, supra note 87. 
2019.2_WILLIAMS_FINAL 4/27/2019 4:19 AM 
650 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
management system.94 In some cases, these systems can be 
used to collect data on hundreds of contract terms. For 
example, Dell works with Axiom, an alternative legal services 
company that provides contract management solutions, to 
collect over three hundred data points from each of its 
contracts.95 This process of tracking contract terms is even 
more streamlined if a company uses an end-to-end contract 
management system that also supports drafting and 
negotiation. These systems allow contract drafters to draft 
and negotiate contracts entirely within the system, thereby 
increasing the ability to collect data on contract terms.96 For 
example, Icertis is a leading contract management company 
that provides customers with an integrated, end-to-end 
system within which they can draft, negotiate, and track all 
of their contracts.97 
In addition to collecting data on contract terms, contract 
management systems can also collect valuable data on 
contract outcomes. This includes front-end outcomes such as 
the time required to draft and negotiate the contract, overall 
drafting costs, and term-by-term negotiating outcomes.98 For 
example, Contract Room enables contract drafters to collect 
front-end outcomes, such as, how long a contract takes to 
 
94 Interview with Oracle Representative, supra note 87; Telephone 
Interview with Airbnb Representative, supra note 87; Telephone Interview 
with Dell Representative, supra note 90; Telephone Interview with 
Microsoft Representatives, supra note 87; Telephone Interview with Public 
Technology Company Representative, supra note 87. 
95 Telephone Interview with Axiom Representative (Mar. 9, 2018); 
Telephone Interview with Dell Representative, supra note 90. 
96 See Interview with Contract Room Representative, in Palo Alto, Cal. 
(Apr. 9, 2018); Telephone Interview with Icertis Representative (Mar. 15, 
2018); Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative (Apr. 3, 2018); 
Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative (Apr. 27, 2018). 
97 Telephone Interview with Icertis Representative, supra note 96; see 
also ICERTIS, https://www.icertis.com/contract-management-software/ 
[https://perma.cc/P6Z8-T8BA]. 
98 Interview with Contract Room Representative, supra note 96; 
Interview with Oracle Representative, supra note 87; Telephone Interview 
with Airbnb Representative, supra note 87; Telephone Interview with 
Microsoft Representatives, supra note 87; Telephone Interview with Public 
Technology Company Representative, supra note 87. 
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negotiate, how frequently certain terms are negotiated, which 
terms create the most negotiating roadblocks, and the total 
cost to draft and negotiate the final contract.99 Contract 
management systems can also collect data on back-end 
outcomes such as payments and deliveries made under the 
contract, whether deal risks flagged during negotiation 
actually occur, and whether the contract results in a dispute 
(and if so, the outcome of the dispute).100 For example, Sirion 
Labs enables contract drafters to collect data on numerous 
back-end contract outcomes.101 For a particular contract, a 
Sirion user can see if the contract is in dispute, and if so, the 
current stage of the dispute.102 The system links disputes to 
specific terms within the contract so the user can see which 
terms cause disputes.103 Once a dispute is resolved, the 
system displays the outcome of the dispute and any associated 
costs.104 Contract managers can also use Sirion to track 
counterparty performance under a contract.105 For a contract 
with a server provider, for example, the system can track the 
percentage of time, within a defined period, during which the 
servers were online and running properly.106 The system also 
 
99 Interview with Contract Room Representative, supra note 96. 
100 Interview with Contract Room Representative, supra note 96; 
Telephone Interview with Dell Representative, supra note 90; Telephone 
Interview with Microsoft Representatives, supra note 87; Telephone 
Interview with Sirion Labs representatives, supra note 96; Telephone 
Interview with Sirion Labs Representative, supra note 96. 
101 Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative (Apr. 27, 
2018), supra note 96; Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative 
(Apr. 3, 2018), supra note 96. 
102 Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative (Apr. 27, 
2018), supra note 96; Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative 
(Apr. 3, 2018), supra note 96. 
103 Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative (Apr. 27, 
2018), supra note 96; Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative 
(Apr. 3, 2018), supra note 96. 
104 Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative (Apr. 27, 
2018), supra note 96; Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative 
(Apr. 3, 2018), supra note 96. 
105 Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs representative (Apr. 27, 
2018), supra note 96. 
106 Id. 
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uses customizable formulas to convert counterparty 
performance data into payment obligations under a 
contract.107 As the use of contract management systems such 
as Sirion continue to grow, contract drafters will have 
increasingly better access to data on contract terms and 
outcomes. 
2. Natural Language Processing 
One of the primary hurdles to collecting data on contract 
terms for machine learning is that these data are stored in an 
unstructured format within natural language contract 
documents such as English-language Microsoft Word files and 
PDFs.108 Despite contract documents containing significant 
amounts of data,109 these data are not in a form that is easily 
useable for machine learning analysis due to their lack of 
structure and labeling.110 To systematically analyze contract 
terms, companies have traditionally had to manually extract, 
structure, and label data from natural language documents, 
which is an incredibly time and labor-intensive process.111 For 
example, some large law firms will have junior associates 
 
107 Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative (Apr. 27, 
2018), supra note 96; Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative 
(Apr. 3, 2018), supra note 96. 
108 See Roach, supra note 19, at 46; Harry Surden, Computable 
Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 629, 642–44 (2012) (distinguishing 
“natural languages” such as English from “formal languages” such as 
computer programming languages). 
109 See Roach, supra note 19, at 50–51 (describing contracts as a 
mineable source of data). 
110 See Surden, supra note 108, at 642–44; Roach, supra note 19, at 46. 
111 Interview with Oracle Representative, supra note 87; Telephone 
Interview with Airbnb Representative, supra note 87; Telephone Interview 
with Contract Assistant Representative (Mar. 8, 2018); Telephone 
Interview with Private Technology Company Representative, supra note 90; 
Telephone Interview with Public Technology Company Representative 
(Apr. 4, 2018); Telephone Interview with Public Technology Company 
Representative, supra note 87. 
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review contracts after signing for the purpose of entering 
contract data into an internal database.112 
Natural language processing (NLP) is a category of 
machine learning research focused on enabling computers to 
understand natural language communication.113 Most NLP 
techniques are statistical in nature.114 Drawing on a training 
set of existing natural language documents, NLP models can 
be trained to understand natural language text based on 
statistical relationships between components of the text such 
as individual words, groups of words, word sequencing, and 
physical layout features like paragraph breaks and page 
positioning.115 An NLP model is often adjusted and retrained 
until it is sufficiently accurate at understanding natural 
language text.116 The model can then be used to process new 
natural language documents outside of the training set. In the 
legal context, NLP has primarily been applied to litigation 
discovery to help human document reviewers sort through 
massive amounts of discovery documents.117 
 Numerous legal technology companies have begun to use 
NLP to extract structured contract term data from natural 
 
112 See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of 
Transactional Lawyering, 41 J. CORP. L. 393, 397 (2015). For example, an 
associate might note in the database whether a venture financing contract 
contains an anti-dilution provision, and if so, what type. 
113 See Surden, supra note 108, at 643. For an overview of NLP, see 
generally CHRISTOPHER D. MANNING & HINRICH SCHÜTZE, FOUNDATIONS OF 
STATISTICAL NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING 3–5 (1999); RUSSELL & 
NORVIG, supra note 72, at 860–67; Robert Dale, Classical Approaches to 
Natural Language Processing, in HANDBOOK OF NATURAL LANGUAGE 
PROCESSING 1–7 (Nitin Indurkhya & Frederick J. Damerau eds., 2d ed. 
2010); Prakash M. Nadkarni, Lucila Ohno-Machado & Wendy W. Chapman, 
Natural Language Processing: An Introduction, 18 J. AM. MED. INFORM. 
ASS’N 544 (2011). 
114 See Surden, supra note 108, at 644. 
115 Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative (Mar. 5, 
2018); Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra note 
60. 
116 Telephone Interview with LawGeex Representative (Mar. 8, 2018); 
Telephone Interview with LegalSifter Representative (Mar. 14, 2018). 
117 See Surden, supra note 108, at 644. 
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language contracts.118 Using NLP to generate structured 
contract term data is far more efficient, cost-effective and 
scalable than the manual alternative. Many legal NLP 
companies also create application programming interfaces 
(“APIs”) that allow their products to integrate with contract 
management systems.119 This enables a company to track and 
use the contract data obtained via NLP within its contract 
management system. While non-legal NLP companies often 
use off-the-shelf NLP software,120 legal NLP companies must 
typically create their own models due to the highly technical 
and unnatural nature of legalese.121 For example, LawGeex 
developed their own NLP model specifically for understanding 
contractual legalese called Legalese Language Processing 
(“LLP”).122 LawGeex’s proprietary LLP model was trained for 
over three years on over 400,000 contracts to understand the 
unique phrasing, sentence structure, and terminology of 
contractual legalese.123 
The main differentiating factor among legal NLP products 
is whether the NLP model is pretrained. Pretrained (also 
known as “out-of-the-box”) models are typically trained on 
large data sets (thousands, tens of thousands, or even 
hundreds of thousands) of relatively simple contracts such as 
 
118 See Our Services, CONTRACTSTANDARDS, https://www.contract 
standards.com/Services [https://perma.cc/48YC-3R3V]; EBREVIA, 
https://ebrevia.com [https://perma.cc/6K6K-H8T8]; How Kira Works, KIRA 
SYSTEMS, https://www.kirasystems.com/how-it-works 
[https://perma.cc/N9N9-CXUU]; LAWGEEX, https://www.lawgeex.com 
[https://perma.cc/ZM36-GG3U]; LEGAL ROBOT, https://www.legalrobot.com 
[https://perma.cc/K3TL-WJTK]; LEGALSIFTER, https://www.legalsifter.com 
[https://perma.cc/Q2W9-HM7Q]. 
119 Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra note 
115; Telephone Interview with Contract Standards Representative, supra 
note 58; Telephone Interview with Beagle Representative (Mar. 9, 2018); 
Telephone Interview with eBrevia Representative (Apr. 6, 2018). 
120 Telephone Interview with Legal Robot Representative (Mar. 14, 
2018). 
121 Telephone Interview with LawGeex Representative (Apr. 11, 2018).  
122 Id. 
123 Id.; see also Telephone Interview with LawGeex Representative 
(Mar. 8, 2018). 
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sales and nondisclosure agreements.124 For example, Contract 
Standards trained its pretrained model on publicly available 
contracts obtained through the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s EDGAR database.125 The advantage of 
pretrained models is that users can apply them immediately 
without having to train the models themselves.126 The 
downside, however, is that pretrained models cannot be used 
to understand types of contracts and terms that are not 
contained within the supplied training set.127 As a result, 
pretrained models are not applicable for more niche and 
complex types of contracts. User-trained models, on the other 
hand, can be applied to any type of contract, but the user must 
supply the contracts that make up the training set.128 The 
number of contracts needed for a user to train a model with 
sufficient accuracy depends on the complexity and variability 
of the contract—the more complex and variable the terms in 
the contract, the larger the required training set.129 For 
example, Kira Systems offers a user-trained model that can 
be applied to any type of contract.130 To use the model, the 
 
124 Telephone Interview with Contract Standards Representative, 
supra note 58; Telephone Interview with eBrevia Representative, supra 
note 119; Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra 
note 115; Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra 
note 60; Telephone Interview with LawGeex Representative, supra note 
123; Telephone Interview with LawGeex Representative, supra note 121; 
Telephone Interview with LegalSifter Representative, supra note 116.  
125 Telephone Interview with Contract Standards Representative, 
supra note 58; see Filings & Forms, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml [https://perma.cc/GK9T-6539]. 
126 Telephone Interview with LawGeex Representative, supra note 123; 
Telephone Interview with LawGeex Representative, supra note 121. 
127 Telephone Interview with LawGeex Representative, supra note 123; 
Telephone Interview with LawGeex Representative, supra note 121. 
128 Telephone Interview with Beagle Representative, supra note 119; 
Telephone Interview with eBrevia Representative, supra note 119; 
Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra note 115; 
Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra note 60; 
Telephone Interview with LegalSifter Representative, supra note 116. 
129 Telephone Interview with eBrevia Representative, supra note 119. 
130 Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra note 
115; Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra note 60. 
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user must provide at least fifty contracts in which the terms 
of interest have been pre-labeled by the user.131 The user then 
clicks a button labeled “Train,” which trains the model on the 
contracts provided.132 After the model has finished training, 
the system displays the model’s accuracy.133 One legal NLP 
company, LegalSifter, has developed a hybrid NLP product 
that resembles both a pretrained and a user-trained model.134 
LegalSifter will work with users to develop user-trained NLP 
models specifically for a user’s niche contracts and terms.135 
LegalSifter then makes these models available to other users 
with similar niche contracts.136 The models are retrained 
every week to take into account feedback and new data from 
all users.137 Through this process, LegalSifter can effectively 
crowdsource the training of new models for any type of 
contract.138 Legal NLP products—including pretrained, user-
trained, and hybrid models—will increase the availability and 
quality of data on contract terms. 
3. Computable Contracts 
While less developed than contract management systems 
and natural language processing, computable contracts 
present a compelling opportunity for expanding the 
availability and quality of contract data. A contract is 
“computable” if it is both machine-readable and machine-
executable.139 A contract is machine-readable if it is expressed 
 
131 Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative supra note 
115. 
132 Id. 
133 Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra note 
115; Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra note 60. 
134 Telephone Interview with LegalSifter Representative, supra note 
116. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 See Surden, supra note 108, at 634–36. Computable contracts are 
often referred to as “smart” contracts. This Article uses the term 
“computable” rather than “smart” because “computable” addresses the 
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in a format that can be processed by a computer.140 As 
discussed above, most contracts are written in a natural 
language, such as English, that is not inherently interpretable 
by a computer. While natural language processing techniques 
are starting to enable computers to understand natural 
languages,141 researchers in a related field of computer 
science are developing computer programming languages that 
can be used to express contracts in a fully machine-readable 
format.142 For example, Sudhir Agarwal, Kevin Xu, and John 
Moghtader recently developed a computable contracting 
language they refer to as Contract Definition Language, 
which they used to model HIPAA regulations.143 A 
computable contract is also machine-executable, which means 
the contract can be automatically executed when supplied 
 
machine-interpretability that is at the heart of computable contracts 
whereas “smart” can mean many different things in different contexts. 
140 Id. at 639.  
141 See supra Section II.C.2. 
142 See generally Roach, supra note 19, at 54–59; Mark D. Flood & 
Oliver R. Goodenough, Contract as Automaton: The Computational 
Representation of Financial Agreements (Office of Fin. Research Working 
Paper No. 15-04, 2017), https://www.financialresearch.gov/working-
papers/2015/03/26/contract-as-automation [https://perma.cc/4C9T-LPS2]; 
Tom Hvitved, Contract Formalisation and Modular Implementation of 
Domain-Specific Languages (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Copenhagen), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/33db/bb29ed7e 
5b7c58dc651a8 c3223bc9711a863.pdf (on file with the Columbia Business 
Law Review); Ronald M. Lee, Candid: A Formal Language for Electronic 
Contracting (Aug. 1998) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2071383 [https://perma.cc/Z2BZ-TTA7]; 
Seyed Morteza Montazeri, Nivir Kanti Singha Roy & Gerardo Schneider, 
From Contracts in Structured English to CL Specifications (Sept. 13, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.2657 [https://perma. 
cc/LR9D-YUK7]; Nick Szabo, A Formal Language for Analyzing Contracts 
(2002) (unpublished manuscript), http://nakamotoinstitute.org/contract-
language [https://perma.cc/9ZC2-MVKY]. 
143 See Sudhir Agarwal, Kevin Xu & John Moghtader, Toward 
Machine-Understandable Contracts, in A14J – Artificial Intelligence for 
Justice, Workshop at the 22nd European Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.ecai2016.org/content/uploads/ 
2016/08/W2-ai4j-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYR2-PC6T]. 
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with real-world performance data.144 For example, a 
computable weather derivative contract could automatically 
transfer money between the parties based on real-world 
weather data. While Sirion Labs does not automatically 
execute contracts between parties, their feature that allows a 
user to calculate contractual obligations based on real-world 
performance data is a simplified version of a machine-
executable contract.145 
Once fully developed, computable contracts will be the 
ideal mechanism for collecting contract data.146 Data on 
contract terms can be easily collected from a computable 
contract because the contract is already written in a 
structured, machine-readable format. This is a substantial 
advantage over manually collecting term data from a natural 
language contract or even automatically extracting the data 
via natural language processing. Rather than needing to 
collect term data from a contract ex post, the terms of a 
computable contract are available for computational analysis 
throughout the contract’s entire life. Computable contracts 
will also improve the collection of contract outcome data. 
Because computable contracts need real-world performance 
data to self-execute, this back-end outcome data can also be 
captured. For example, a computable contract for the delivery 
of widgets could collect performance data such as when the 
widgets are delivered, how many widgets are delivered, and 
the quality of the widgets delivered. Based on this 
information, the contract could determine whether the 
delivering party properly performed and, if so, how much the 
party should be paid under the contract. If the delivering 
party does not properly perform, the contract could flag that 
 
144 See Surden, supra note 108, at 658–59. Computable contracts can 
be used to collect outcome data regardless of whether the contract is 
completely self-executing or whether the contract merely produces a prima 
facie assessment that is then reviewed by the parties. Id. at 636. As a result, 
this Article does not take a position on whether computable contracts should 
be completely self-executing. 
145 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
146 See Surden, supra note 108, at 690–94 (noting that computable 
contracts can be used as inputs for other systems). 
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there is a dispute. Meanwhile, all of this outcome data could 
be collected and made available for analysis. 
Although computable contracts are not yet available for 
widespread use, a critical technological innovation has 
substantially increased their feasibility: blockchain. Initially 
introduced in 2008, blockchain is best known as the 
technology that underlies digital currencies such as bitcoin.147 
A blockchain is a continuously growing public ledger of 
transactions (known as “blocks”) supported by a distributed, 
peer-to-peer network that uses cryptography to ensure the 
validity of the blocks in the overall chain.148 The key feature 
of a blockchain network is that it does not require a trust 
intermediary such as a bank or clearinghouse to validate 
transactions on the network.149 Instead, the integrity of a 
blockchain network is maintained by what is commonly 
referred to as a “proof-of-work” system.150 A proof-of-work 
system functions by having a distributed network of “miners” 
 
147 For the original Bitcoin paper that introduced blockchain 
technology, see Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash 
System BITCOIN.ORG, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/N55D-
LTXA]. The paper was published under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto. 
The identity of the person or persons who created Bitcoin and blockchain 
remains a mystery, though there are many theories. See Satoshi Nakamoto, 
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Satoshi_Nakamoto [https://perma 
.cc/2CKU-K6WK]. 
148 See Nakamoto, supra note 147; see also Catherine Martin 
Christopher, The Bridging Model: Exploring the Roles of Trust and 
Enforcement in Banking, Bitcoin, and the Blockchain, 17 NEV. L.J. 139, 152 
(2016); Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer 
Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35, 36–37 (2014); Shahla 
Hazratjee, Note, Bitcoin: The Trade of Digital Signatures, 41 T. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 55, 58–60 (2015); Trevor Kiviat, Note, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in 
Regulating Blockchain Transactions, 65 DUKE L.J. 569, 578–80 (2015); 
Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Feb. 2017; Emile Loza de Siles, Blockchain: A Short Primer for 
Lawyers, L.J. NEWSLETTERS, Mar. 2017, http://www.lawjournalnews 
letters.com/sites/lawjournalnewsletters/2017/03/01/blockchain-a-short-
primer-for-lawyers/?slreturn=20180408202029[https://perma.cc/P446-
KVT8 ]. 
149 See Nakamoto, supra note 147; see also Christopher, supra note 148, 
at 17; Fairfield, supra note 148, at 40; Kiviat, supra note 148, at 574. 
150 See Nakamoto, supra note 147, at 3. 
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complete computationally difficult cryptographic tasks to 
verify transactions on the blockchain network.151 Each 
verified transaction block is added to a chain of previously 
verified blocks and the “longest” chain (i.e. the sequence with 
the most verified transactions) is treated as the official 
chain.152 Miners are rewarded for their work with units of 
value on the network, of which Bitcoin is an example.153 To 
disrupt the validity of a blockchain network, a bad actor would 
need to amass a majority of computing power on the network, 
which could be incredibly expensive.154 Such an actor would 
not have an incentive to do so, however, because trust in the 
network would deteriorate and the actor’s units of value on 
the network would become worthless.155 While public 
attention has largely focused on blockchain’s cryptocurrency 
applications, many commentators have noted that 
blockchain’s ability to verify transactions without needing a 
trust intermediary has the potential to enable computable 
contracts.156  
Companies and organizations have begun to experiment 
with blockchain-enabled computable contracts, the most 
notable of which is Ethereum.157 Ethereum has created a 
blockchain-enabled platform on top of which users can build 
 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 4. 
154 Id. at 3. This is commonly referred to as a fifty-one percent attack. 
155 Id. at 4. 
156 See Christopher, supra note 148, at 16; Karen E.C. Levy, Book-
Smart, Not Street-Smart: Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts and the Social 
Workings of Law, 3 ENGAGING SCI., TECH., & SOC’Y 1, 1–3 (2017); Max 
Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO L. TECH. REV. 305, 
317–19 (2017); Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 128, 145–46 (2017); Hazratjee, supra note 148, at 83; Kiviat, supra 
note 148, at 573, 603, 605–06. 
157 See A Next Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized 
Application Platform, GITHUB, https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/W 
hite-Paper [https://perma.cc/9YT8-KRPP]; see also Ethereum, 
https://www.ethereum.org [https://perma.cc/NM4H-DXRF]. 
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their own computable contract applications.158 The platform 
even includes a “contract-oriented” programming language for 
computable contracts, known as Solidity.159 Using Solidity, 
computable contract developers can implement any number of 
innovative contract designs. As platforms such as Ethereum 
continue to grow and improve, computable contracts will 
likely begin to move into the mainstream of contracting, 
thereby creating new opportunities for collecting high-quality, 
structured contract data at scale. Future research will be 
needed to explore how to best design computable contracts to 
function as mechanisms for data collection. 
D. Beyond Automation 
Predictive contracting differs from traditional contract 
automation both in its primary objective and in its 
technological foundation. Introduced in the 1970s,160 contract 
automation technology has traditionally focused on reducing 
the cost and time associated with drafting a contract.161 The 
classic example of this type of contract automation is 
LegalZoom, a web-based service that allows users to generate 
legal documents covering issues ranging from employment 
agreements to wills and trusts to basic intellectual property 
matters.162 The target user is a non-lawyer who wants a fast 
and cheap way to generate a legal document without having 
 
158 See A Next Generation, supra note 157, at 14 (describing Ethereum 
as “a blockchain with a built-in Turing-complete programming language, 
allowing anyone to write smart contracts and decentralized applications 
where they can create their own arbitrary rules for ownership, transaction 
formats and state transition functions”). 
159 See SOLIDITY, https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.4.23 [https://per 
ma.cc/W3BJ-8JSZ]. 
160 See Kathryn D. Betts & Kyle R. Jaep, The Dawn of Fully Automated 
Contract Drafting: Machine Learning Breathes New Life into a Decades-Old 
Promise, 15 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.216, 218 (2017). 
161 See supra note 30. 
162 See LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com [https://perma.cc/ 
4VNV-EH7N]. 
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to hire a lawyer.163 The documents involved tend to be highly 
standardized and require relatively little customization. 
There are also automation products targeted at lawyers that 
help them assemble routine documents in a short amount of 
time.164 In both cases, the automation technology is intended 
to reduce the time and cost of producing a “good enough” 
contract. Predictive contracting, on the other hand, is focused 
on making contracts substantively better by providing 
contract drafters with statistical insights into the connections 
between contract terms and outcomes. 
Predictive contracting also employs fundamentally 
different technology than traditional contract automation 
products. Most contract automation tools are built on top of 
pre-coded, rules-based logic systems.165 These tools ask the 
user a variety of questions, and then, based on the user’s 
responses and the system’s internal logic (developed with the 
input of a subject matter expert such as a lawyer), present the 
user with additional questions until the tool has worked 
through the entire logic tree.166 The tool then generates a 
document for the user from a set of pre-coded terms.167 Unlike 
traditional automation tools, the internal logic of a predictive 
contracting system does not have to be explicitly defined ex 
ante.168 Instead, predictive contracting relies on statistical 
machine learning models that develop their own logic over 
 
163 LegalZoom, however, does offer a premium service to connect users 
with a lawyer for more complex matters. 
164 Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, a large Silicon Valley law firm, 
developed an internal automation tool that allows associates to generate a 
full set of “startup documents” for a new company, including a certificate of 
incorporation, founder stock purchase agreements, and company bylaws, by 
answering a set of pre-generated questions. See WSGR Term Sheet 
Generator, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, https://www.wsgr.com/ 
WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=practice/termsheet.htm [https://perma 
.cc/P4RP-BLZF]. 
165 See Betts & Jaep, supra note 160, at 218–19. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 See Surden, supra note 35, at 93–95; Remus & Levy, supra note 44, 
at 9 (distinguishing between deductive instructions and data-driven 
instructions). 
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time based on a training data set.169 Two primary 
implications arise from this technological difference. First, 
because a traditional automation tool derives its logic from a 
real-world expert, such as a lawyer, it will never be able to 
generate a better contract than the expert could have 
generated on her own (though the tool will often be faster and 
cheaper). Predictive contracting, on the other hand, generates 
its insights by analyzing large amounts of data in a way that 
a lawyer cannot. As a result, a predictive contracting system 
is complimentary to a lawyer’s experience as opposed to 
merely replicative. Second, traditional automation tools are 
static whereas predictive contracting is dynamic. A 
traditional tool has to be pre-coded and therefore its logic 
cannot change over time unless it is recoded. On the other 
hand, a predictive contracting system can continuously 
update its logic as it is supplied with additional data from 
subsequent contracts, thereby improving its accuracy and 
generating better insights. 
III. DISCUSSION 
Predictive contracting has theoretical and practical 
implications. At the same time, predictive contracting faces a 
variety of limitations and risks. This Part examines these 
issues and proceeds as follows. Section III.A discusses the 
theoretical implications of predictive contracting, Section 
III.B discusses the practical implications, and Section III.C 
discusses the limitations and risks. 
A. Theoretical Implications 
Predictive contracting has multiple implications for the 
theory of contract design. The Sections below examine how 
predictive contracting can lead to (1) greater customization, 
(2) increased innovation, (3) more complete contract design, 
(4) more effective balancing of front-end and back-end costs, 
(5) better risk assessment and allocation, and (6) more 
accurate term pricing for negotiation. 
 
169 See supra Section II.A; see also Surden, supra note 35, at 93–95. 
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1. Customization 
Contracts (both business-to-business and business-to-
consumer) frequently display a high degree of 
standardization.170 This can be seen in the widespread use of 
boilerplate provisions in commercial contracts.171 These 
boilerplate terms often prove quite resistant to change and 
will sometimes remain in use despite adverse shocks.172 This 
prevalence of standardization runs counter to the traditional 
efficient contracting view that predicts that parties to a 
contract will select the set of terms that maximizes the joint 
value generated by the contract.173 Assuming that contracting 
scenarios display some degree of heterogeneity from one 
scenario to the next, contracts should reflect this 
 
170 See generally GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 18; Boardman, supra note 
15; Choi & Gulati, supra note 17; Choi & Gulati, supra note 82; Choi, Gulati 
& Posner, supra note 17; Goetz & Scott, supra note 15; Hill, supra note 18; 
Kahan & Klausner, supra note 17; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15; 
Klausner, supra note 15; Korobkin, supra note 18; Richman, supra note 18; 
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9; Triantis, supra note 21. 
171 See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 2–3 (describing the use of a 
“pari passu” clause in over ninety percent of cross-border sovereign bond 
contracts); Choi & Gulati, supra note 82, at 1130 (discussing the use of form 
contracts in business-to-consumer contracting); Hill, supra note 18, at 59, 
63 (highlighting the use of forms in transactional law practice and 
describing how law firms use forms during the drafting process); Kahan & 
Klausner, supra note 15, at 718 (describing evidence of contractual 
boilerplate, such as bond indentures and corporate charters); Klausner, 
supra note 15, at 762 (discussing the use of form documentation in corporate 
contracting). 
172 See Choi & Gulati, supra note 17, at 934–35 (providing empirical 
evidence of a slow shift in standardized terms following an external shock); 
Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 17, at 3, 7–10 (proposing a model of 
boilerplate evolution in which an external shock disrupts pre-shock 
standardization causing a period of innovation that ultimately leads to post-
shock standardization). The authors provide empirical evidence for this 
model of evolution from New York and English sovereign bond markets. Id. 
at 27, 35; see also GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 2–3 (discussing how a 
boilerplate “pari passu” clause used in cross-border sovereign bond 
contracts failed to be modified or discontinued even after an adverse judicial 
interpretation). 
173 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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heterogeneity in their design. Yet this is typically not 
observed. 
The contracts literature has posited numerous 
explanations for the prevalence of standardized terms in 
commercial contracts.174 From these varied explanations, two 
common themes arise. First, standardized terms are faster 
and cheaper to use than nonstandard terms and therefore 
standardization reduces transaction costs.175 Second, 
 
174 For a good overview of proposed reasons for contract 
standardization, see GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 34–43 (discussing 
reasons including learning externalities, network externalities, negative 
signaling, hindsight bias, satisficing, drafting routinization, herd behavior, 
collective action and free riding, endowment effects, and a lack of 
understanding of boilerplate terms). For a discussion of learning and 
network externalities, see Choi & Gulati, supra note 17, at 934–36 
(providing empirical evidence of network externalities in the sovereign bond 
market); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 718–27, 742–60 (describing 
the effects of learning and network externalities and providing empirical 
evidence from bond covenants). For a discussion of cognitive biases, see 
Kahan & Klausner, supra note 17, at 359–64 (discussing status quo bias, 
anchoring bias, and conformity bias); Korobkin, supra note 18, at 1586–87 
(describing how status quo and endowment bias lead to a higher prevalence 
of standardized terms). For a discussion of herd behavior, see GULATI & 
SCOTT, supra note 18, at 149; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 17, at 356–58 
(noting that contract drafters are incentivized to use standardized, widely-
used terms because if these terms fail, then the drafters are failing as a 
group rather than individually). For a discussion of agency costs, see GULATI 
& SCOTT, supra note 18, at 6 (arguing that inefficient standardization in the 
sovereign bond market arose because contract drafters were incentivized to 
promote volume-based, “cookie-cutter” transactions); Hill, supra note 18, at 
77–78 (discussing how law firms frequently lack an incentive to produce a 
better form); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 17, at 353–55; Richman, supra 
note 18, at 79–82 (identifying that contract drafters are incentivized to use 
standardized terms that have previously been used and that law firms are 
incentivized to develop routines for the mass production of homogenous 
contracts). 
175 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 15, at 262–64, 290 (describing how 
implied contract terms reduce transaction costs by providing contracting 
parties with standardized “preformulations”); Klausner, supra note 15, at 
782–84 (discussing how it is cheaper and faster for contract drafters to use 
standardized terms); Triantis, supra note 21, at 186–87 (noting that 
standardized terms reduce costs associated with contract drafting primarily 
because they can easily be redeployed). 
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standardized terms are more familiar to the contracting 
parties, lawyers, third parties, and courts and are therefore 
more predictable than nonstandard terms.176 
Despite these apparent benefits, contracts can be 
inefficiently over-standardized. For example, assume that a 
company can choose between multiple different available 
versions of a particular contract term (Versions A, B, C, etc.). 
Over time, the company has settled on Version A as the 
standard version of the term. Version A is cheap and reliable. 
Assume that the cost to include Version A in the contract is 
effectively zero and the joint value generated by Version A in 
any contracting scenario is $10. In certain contracting 
scenarios, however, other versions of the term, while costlier 
to include, generate a net joint value of greater than $10. For 
example, in certain scenarios, Version B, which costs $10 to 
include, generates a joint value of $30 for a net joint value of 
$20, greater than the joint value generated by Version A. As 
a result, the standardized practice of always using Version A 
leads to a loss of total joint value across all contracting 
scenarios. 
Predictive contracting can lead to a more efficient mix of 
standardization and customization in three ways. First, 
predictive contracting can reduce the cost and time associated 
with drafting and incorporating nonstandard terms. A 
predictive contracting system can supply contract drafters 
with a library of available contract terms. Instead of having to 
craft bespoke contract terms from scratch (a costly and time-
 
176 See Boardman, supra note 15, at 1107 (proposing that contract 
drafters may be willing to accept a standardized term that has an inefficient 
judicial interpretation as long as that interpretation is fixed and therefore 
produces little to no uncertainty); Choi & Gulati, supra note 17, at 931 
(highlighting that standardized terms reduce uncertainty); Goetz & Scott, 
supra note 15, at 263–64 (noting that courts have a preference for 
standardized implied terms and often disapprove of attempts to modify 
these terms with nonstandard express terms); Kahan & Klausner, supra 
note 17, at 353–55 (describing how contract drafters—who are often 
lawyers—are typically more risk averse than parties and therefore are more 
likely to use standardized terms than would otherwise be efficient due to 
the low uncertainty of these terms); Klausner, supra note 15, at 776–79 
(discussing the judicial interpretative benefits of using standardized terms). 
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consuming process), contract drafters can select from different 
versions of terms available in the predictive contracting 
system and customize them as necessary. For example, Sirion 
Labs provides contract drafters with a contract creation tool 
that uses historical contract data.177 The tool contains a 
searchable, filterable library of all of the user’s past contract 
terms.178 For a given term, the tool displays different versions 
of that term that the user has used before.179 A contract 
drafter can build a draft of a contract by dragging and 
dropping terms from the term library into the draft, modifying 
them as necessary and supplying condition data such as party 
identities and dates.180 Second, predictive contracting can 
make nonstandard terms more predictable, thereby reducing 
the uncertainty associated with these terms. A predictive 
contracting system can supply contract drafters with 
information on the statistical connections between contract 
terms and outcomes, including the likelihood of litigation and 
potential adverse judicial interpretation. Equipped with this 
information, contract drafters can make better-informed 
decisions about the inclusion of nonstandard terms.181 Third, 
predictive contracting can facilitate the use of highly-tailored, 
context-specific contract terms. A predictive contracting 
model can take into account exogenous conditions, such as 
party and transaction characteristics, and provide the 
contract drafter with insights into how these external factors 
 
177 Telephone Interview with Sirion Labs Representative, supra note 
96. 
178 Id. For example, a user can filter the term library based on 
characteristics such as the type of contract, the name of the counterparty, 
the counterparty’s industry, and the jurisdiction of the contract. Id. 
179 Id. Contract drafters can label these terms for negotiation purposes 
as either “preferred,” “fall-back,” or “walk-away.” Id. 
180 Id.  
181 This requires the predictive contracting system to have been trained 
on contracts containing nonstandard terms. For some nonstandard terms, 
it may be the case that they have been used so infrequently that there are 
insufficient data to train the model. From a prediction perspective, 
nonstandard terms such as these are similar to novel terms that have never 
been used. For a discussion of how predictive contracting can assist with the 
generation of novel terms, see infra Section III.A.2. 
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affect the connections between terms and outcomes. Contract 
drafters can use this information to select the best set of terms 
given the exogenous conditions present in the contracting 
scenario. 
Returning to the hypothetical example discussed above, a 
predictive contracting system could enable the company to 
identify the contracting scenarios in which alternative 
versions of the term in question generate greater joint value 
than Version A. As a result, the company would be able to 
select the value-maximizing version of the term in each 
contracting scenario. In addition, an easily-accessible library 
of terms containing examples of alternative versions would 
likely reduce the cost associated with using these alternative 
versions. As this example demonstrates, predictive 
contracting can lead to a more efficient selection of contract 
terms given a set of exogenous conditions. 
2. Innovation 
Closely related to the issue of standardization versus 
customization is the issue of contract innovation. Whereas 
customization is concerned with the selection of efficient 
contract terms from a set of available terms and the tailoring 
of those terms to specific contracting scenarios, innovation is 
concerned with the generation of new terms.182 Contract 
innovation is critically important to contract design because it 
is the source of novel terms.183 Contract innovation expands 
the option set of available terms from which contract drafters 
can select when designing a contract. Yet despite the 
importance of contract innovation, contract drafters rarely 
innovate.184  
 
182 See Triantis, supra note 21, at 192 (discussing the difference 
between customization and innovation and highlighting the scalability of 
innovative terms). 
183 See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 164 (stressing the importance 
of contract innovation). 
184 See generally GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 18; Boardman, supra note 
15; Choi & Gulati, supra note 17; Goetz & Scott, supra note 15; Kahan & 
Klausner, supra note 17; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15; Triantis, supra 
note 21. 
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The contracts literature suggests two primary reasons for 
the inefficiently low level of contract innovation observed in 
the market.185 First, innovative terms have not been 
previously assessed by the contracting parties, lawyers, third 
parties, and courts, and are therefore more uncertain than 
existing terms.186 Second, parties typically have a difficult 
time identifying the effects of specific terms, and therefore, 
contract drafters (who are primarily evaluated on whether a 
contract performs poorly) have little incentive to take on the 
cost and risk of innovating if success from their innovation is 
unlikely to be recognized.187 For example, assume a contract 
drafter is faced with a decision between using an existing term 
or a new term. The existing term is familiar and has a 100% 
chance of generating $10 of value for the drafter’s client. The 
new term, on the other hand, has a 50% chance of generating 
$50 and a 50% chance of losing $10, for an expected value of 
$20.188 Assuming the client is risk neutral,189 it would prefer 
 
185 A third, related reason for the lack of innovation flows from the two 
primary reasons: organizational impediments faced by contract drafters. 
See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 145–49, 161 (describing barriers to 
innovation within law firms, including examples of contract drafters being 
reprimanded for attempting to innovate); Smith & King, supra note 82, at 
31 (noting how contracts can become intertwined with other organizational 
processes, which leads to innovation inertia); Triantis, supra note 21, at 186 
(discussing structural impediments that prevent contract drafters from 
having an incentive to innovate). 
186 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 15, at 263 (discussing how innovative 
terms are more likely to be misinterpreted by courts). 
187 See Gardner, supra note 22, at 43–44 (providing examples of the 
difficulty parties face in determining the value of services provided by 
contract drafters); Goetz & Scott, supra note 15, at 291 (noting that contract 
drafters considering innovating must incur the cost of identifying terms that 
are superior to existing terms); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 17, at 353–
55 (discussing how contract drafters are frequently judged based on 
whether a contract fails rather than whether they identify the optimal set 
of terms and that the success of a new term may not be attributed to the 
contract drafter’s innovation); Triantis, supra note 21, at 180, 194 (arguing 
that contract innovation is stymied by the inability of parties to evaluate 
the effects of specific contract terms). 
188 Expected value = (0.5 * $50) + (0.5 * -$10) = $20. 
189 An entity is risk neutral if it prefers the option with the greatest 
expected value, regardless of risk. 
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that the contract drafter use the new term. Assume, however, 
that the client cannot observe the magnitude of the result, 
only whether the result is positive or negative.190 In this 
example, the contract drafter will always choose the existing 
term, which has a 100% chance of generating a positive result, 
even though the new term is better for the client. This 
principal-agent problem can lead contract drafters to select 
terms that serve their own interests, but not necessarily those 
of their clients. 
Predictive contracting can lead to a greater level of 
contract innovation in three ways. First, predictive 
contracting can track the effects of innovative terms by 
identifying ex-post connections between these terms and 
various contract outcomes. If contract drafters have an 
effective means of demonstrating to parties the effects of their 
innovations, they will have a much stronger incentive to 
innovate in the first place. In the above example, the contract 
drafter could use a predictive contracting system to show the 
client that the new term generates a greater expected value 
than the existing term over a sufficiently large number of 
contracting instances. In this example, the predictive 
contracting system aligns the incentives of the client and the 
contract drafter, thereby helping to mitigate the principal-
agent problem.  
Second, unlike traditional automation technologies, 
predictive contracting can assist with the generation of new 
terms.191 Natural language processing (“NLP”) can break 
contract terms down into their constituent conceptual 
subparts, known as ontologies.192 For example, Legal Robot is 
 
190 This is a simplified representation of the fact that parties typically 
evaluate a contract drafter based on whether the contract did “poorly” or 
not. 
191 See Betts & Jaep, supra note 160, at 227 (noting that historically, 
contract automation tools have been unable to produce novel contract 
language). 
192 Telephone Interview with Legal Robot Representative, supra note 
120; see Dominique Estival, Chris Nowak & Andrew Zschorn, Towards 
Ontology-Based Natural Language Processing, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
WORKSHOP ON NLP AND XML 59–66 (2004). 
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developing NLP technology that deconstructs contract terms 
into the fundamental building blocks of contract language.193 
A predictive contracting system equipped with this technology 
could identify connections between these contract subparts 
and various contract outcomes. Contract drafters could use 
this information during the contract innovation process to 
have an understanding ex ante of the potential effects of a new 
term. Figure 2 shows an example of this process. 
 
Figure 2: Innovation Example 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 2, a predictive contracting system 
equipped with ontological NLP technology can deconstruct 
two terms, Term 1 and Term 2, into their constituent 
subparts. Term 1 is comprised of Subparts A, B, and C and 
Term 2 is comprised of Subparts A, D, and E. A contract 
drafter is considering using a new term, Term 3, that is 
comprised of Subparts A, B, D, and E. Based on prior use of 
Terms 1 and 2, the predictive contracting system can provide 
the contract drafter with information on connections between 
the subparts that make up Term 3 and various contract 
 
193 Telephone Interview with Legal Robot Representative, supra note 
120. 
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outcomes. This information can help the contract drafter 
understand the likely effects of Term 3 on relevant outcomes. 
For example, the drafter may be particularly concerned with 
the likelihood of Term 3 resulting in litigation and can 
therefore examine the connections between Subparts A, B, D, 
and E and litigation outcomes. The predictive contracting 
system enables the contract drafter to predict potential effects 
of an innovative term. 
Third, predictive contracting can enable contractual 
experimentation. If a company engages in a sufficiently large 
volume of contracting, it can use predictive contracting to “A/B 
test” a new contract term or set of terms. For example, assume 
a company currently uses Version A of a term but is interested 
in potentially using Version B. Using predictive contracting 
technology, the company could run a controlled experiment in 
which it randomly assigns Version A to one set of contracts 
and Version B to another set. The company can then track the 
effects of Versions A and B on outcomes of interest. 
3. Completeness 
Contracts are frequently described as a set of conditional 
directions that specify the obligations of the parties with 
respect to one another in a variety of contingent future 
states.194 Based on this view, the ideal contract is a “complete 
contingent” contract, one that contains directions for every 
possible future state of the world.195 Despite the appeal of 
contractual completeness, real-world contracts are incomplete 
because they do not account for all potential contingencies.196 
 
194 See Anderlini & Felli, supra note 18, at 4 (modeling contracts as 
algorithmic maps that connect contingent states with the actions to be taken 
if those states occur); Goetz & Scott, supra note 15, at 264 (noting that the 
key feature of a contract is the ability to specify directions for future 
contingencies); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 557 (highlighting the 
“intertemporal” nature of contracts); Scott & Triantis, supra note 16, at 188 
(defining a contract as a legally binding promise to act in the future). 
195 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 15, at 267; Williamson, supra note 25, 
at 236. 
196 See generally Anderlini & Felli, supra note 18; Ian Ayres & Robert 
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
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While the contracts literature provides multiple explanations 
for contractual incompleteness,197 by far the most common 
explanation is that there are too many potential contingencies 
for contract drafters to feasibly design contracts that account 
for all future states.198 As a result, contracts are often 
incomplete, especially with respect to low-likelihood 
contingencies.199 
 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Choi & Gulati, supra note 82; Claire 
A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms Theory of 
Incomplete Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191 (2009); Choi & Triantis, supra 
note 81; Katz, supra note 18; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9; Scott & 
Triantis, supra note 19; Scott & Triantis, supra note 16.  
197 For a good literature summary of contractual incompleteness, see 
Scott & Triantis, supra note 19, at 816; see also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 
196, at 94 (describing how a party may strategically withhold information 
that would make a contract more complete so as to increase its percentage 
share of the value generated by the contract); Choi & Triantis, supra note 
81, at 859–60 (arguing that contractual incompleteness “can facilitate the 
provision of efficient incentives and the signaling of private information at 
the time of contracting and of renegotiation”); Hill, supra note 196, at 208–
12 (discussing how contractual incompleteness increases the uncertainty 
and potential cost of litigation and can therefore serve as an ex ante bonding 
mechanism to deter ex post litigation); Katz, supra note 18, at 172–74. 
198 See Anderlini & Felli, supra note 18, at 8 (defining incomplete 
contracts as “contracts that show evidence that the contracting parties were 
constrained in their ability to distinguish between states when the contract 
was drawn up”) (emphasis in original); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 196, at 
92–94; Choi & Gulati, supra note 82, at 1159 (describing how parties 
rationally choose to neither contract for every contingency nor clarify every 
potential meaning of a term and therefore accept contractual 
incompleteness); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 594–95; Scott & 
Triantis, supra note 16, at 189–90 (arguing that complete contingent 
contracts are impossible given the costs associated with planning for all 
potential future states); Smith & King, supra note 82, at 7, 17. 
199 See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 559 (noting that parties will 
often choose not to bear the costs associated with contracting for low 
likelihood contingencies); Choi & Gulati, supra note 82, at 1155–56 (citing 
Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s 
Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 747 
(1999) (discussing how incompleteness in industry customs is often 
associated with low probability contingencies that trade associations choose 
not to expend resources on)). 
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Predictive contracting can increase contractual 
completeness by providing contract drafters with information 
on the set of potential future states and their associated 
likelihoods. For example, assume a contract drafter is 
designing a term for a contract and is deciding what potential 
contingencies to plan for. From the drafter’s personal 
experience and that of her colleagues, the drafter knows that 
Contingencies A and B are by far the most common and that 
Contingency C occasionally happens as well. Traditionally, 
the drafter would likely design the term to account for 
Contingencies A, B, and C. Assume instead, however, that the 
drafter has access to a predictive contracting system trained 
on a dataset of thousands of similar contracts. The system 
shows the drafter that Contingency A occurs fifty percent of 
the time, Contingency B occurs forty percent of the time, 
Contingency C occurs five percent of the time, and 
Contingencies D through H each occur approximately one 
percent of the time. The drafter can then use this information 
to design a more complete term. While complete contingent 
contracts are still infeasible,200 predictive contracting can 
increase contractual completeness relative to traditional 
contracting. 
4. Cost Balancing 
The costs associated with a contract can be divided 
between the front-end and the back-end of the contract’s 
life.201 Front-end costs include any costs to negotiate the 
contract, conduct due diligence, design and draft the contract, 
and execute the contract.202 Back-end costs include any costs 
 
200 But see Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving 
Contracts, 43 J. CORP. L. 1, 1, 12–15 (2017) (suggesting that advances in 
predictive analytics will eventually lead to contracts that are perfectly 
complete because they will use technology and data to convert ex ante 
objectives into ex post directives for the parties given any set of 
contingencies). 
201 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
202 See Choi & Triantis, supra note 81, at 851; Posner, supra note 81, 
at 1583–84; Scott & Triantis, supra note 19, at 814, 817, 822–24; Scott & 
Triantis, supra note 16, at 190–91. 
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to perform obligations under the contract, monitor 
performance, and potentially renegotiate, arbitrate, or litigate 
the contract.203 Between the front-end and back-end of a 
contract’s life, uncertainty is resolved regarding which 
contingent state of the world will occur.204 According to the 
contracts literature, parties should (and do) balance front-end 
and back-end costs.205 The general view is that investing in 
front-end costs reduces back-end costs.206 For example, 
spending additional resources during the front-end to make a 
contract more complete and precise reduces the likelihood 
that the contract will result in litigation, and if it does, reduces 
the likelihood that a judge will misinterpret the contract.207 
In order for contract drafters to efficiently balance front-
end and back-end costs, they need to understand the 
connections between these costs. Without this information, 
 
203 See Choi & Triantis, supra note 81, at 851; Posner, supra note 81, 
at 1583–84; Scott & Triantis, supra note 19, at 814, 817, 822–24; Scott & 
Triantis, supra note 16, at 190–91. 
204 See Scott & Triantis, supra note 19, at 823 (drawing the distinction 
between the front-end and back-end of a contract’s life as the resolution of 
uncertainty). 
205 See Posner, supra note 81, at 1583–84; Scott & Triantis, supra note 
19, at 814, 817, 836 (proposing the use of indifference curves to model the 
efficient tradeoff between front-end and back-end costs); Scott & Triantis, 
supra note 16, at 196–98. 
206 See Posner, supra note 81, at 1608; Scott & Triantis, supra note 19, 
at 814, 817, 822–24, 836; Scott & Triantis, supra note 16, at 196–98. But see 
Hill, supra note 196, at 208–12 (arguing that less specific contract terms, 
which lead to lower front-end costs, can serve as a bonding mechanism that 
deters parties from engaging in litigation, thereby reducing back-end costs 
as well); Choi & Triantis, supra note 81, at 852–55, 859–60, 883, 885, 921–
22 (arguing that vague terms with lower front-end costs can incentivize an 
efficient provision of information ex ante to deter adverse selection, thereby 
reducing back-end litigation costs). Choi & Triantis provide a series of 
numerical examples for their proposed theory using the context of a 
material adverse change clause in an acquisition agreement. See Choi & 
Triantis, supra note 81, at 896–920. 
207 The tradeoff between vague (less costly) and precise (costlier) 
contract terms during the front-end and the effects of contractual 
preciseness on back-end litigation costs has been compared to the tradeoff 
between rules and standards from the literature on legislation and 
regulation. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 19, at 820. 
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parties may engage in inefficient balancing. For example, 
assume that a contract drafter is considering how much time 
and effort to invest in the design of a term during the front-
end of a contract’s life. The drafter can either design a vague 
term that is less expensive (Term 1) or a precise term that is 
more expensive (Term 2). Assume Term 2 is $10 more 
expensive in the front-end than Term 1. The drafter should 
therefore select Term 2 if Term 2 will save more than $10 in 
expected value on the back-end relative to Term 1. Assume 
the relevant back-end cost in this scenario is potential 
litigation and that litigation carries a cost of $100. The drafter 
should therefore use Term 2 if Term 2 reduces the likelihood 
of litigation relative to Term 1 by more than 10%.208 To make 
this determination, the drafter needs information on the 
front-end cost of Term 2 relative to Term 1, the cost of 
litigation, and the reduction in the likelihood of litigation 
associated with Term 2 relative to Term 1. If the drafter 
mistakenly believes that Term 2 reduces the likelihood of 
litigation by 15% but Term 2 actually only reduces the 
likelihood by 5%, the drafter would inefficiently invest in 
Term 2 during the front-end, thereby increasing overall 
contracting costs. 
Predictive contracting can lead to more efficient cost 
balancing by providing contract drafters with key information 
regarding front-end and back-end costs. A predictive 
contracting system can track both front-end and back-end 
costs associated with a particular type of contract. The system 
can then use these data (along with data on relevant 
exogenous conditions) to identify connections between front-
 
208 The drafter should use Term 2 if the benefit of Term 2 relative to 
Term 1 is greater than the cost of Term 2 relative to Term 1, which is $10. 
The benefit of Term 2 relative to Term 1 can be represented as the reduction 
in the likelihood of litigation multiplied by the cost of litigation, which is 
$100. The balancing equation is therefore: Cost of Term 2 = $10 < Benefit of 
Term 2 = Reduction in Litigation Likelihood * $100. The benefit of Term 2 
is therefore greater than the cost of Term 2 if Term 2 reduces the likelihood 
of litigation by more than ten percent. This is a contractual application of 
the famous formula for determining negligence set forth by Judge Learned 
Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 
1947). 
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end and back-end costs. In the previous example, a predictive 
contracting system could provide the contract drafter with the 
expected front-end costs of Terms 1 and 2 and the range of 
expected litigation outcomes (including likelihoods and costs) 
associated with these terms. The contract drafter would 
therefore be able to make a better-informed (and likely more 
efficient) cost balancing decision. In addition, as discussed 
previously, predictive contracting systems can reduce the cost 
of designing and drafting customized, context specific 
terms.209 This enables contract drafters to include precise 
terms in the front-end at lower cost, thereby increasing the 
number of situations in which front-end investment can 
reduce overall contracting costs. 
5. Risk Assessment and Allocation 
Most traditional contracting occurs under uncertainty.210 
At the time of designing a contract, the parties and their 
contract drafters typically do not know which contingent state 
of the world will occur, nor do they know the full set of possible 
contingent states or the probability distribution of these 
states. Contract drafters, like most humans, are bad at 
making decisions under uncertainty, especially when dealing 
with very low-probability contingencies.211 Drafters are much 
 
209 See supra Section II.A.1. 
210 See Boardman, supra note 15, at 1107; Choi & Gulati, supra note 
17, at 931; Choi & Triantis, supra note 81, at 882; Hill, supra note 196, at 
208–12; Korobkin, supra note 18, at 1622; Scott & Triantis, supra note 19, 
at 823; Scott & Triantis, supra note 16 (describing the difficulty contract 
drafters face in attempting to achieve both ex ante and ex post efficiency 
under uncertainty); Smith & King, supra note 82, at 7; Williamson, supra 
note 18, at 555 (listing uncertainty as one of the three key features of 
contracts along with frequency and asset specificity); Williamson, supra 
note 25, at 259 (discussing the importance of transaction-specific contract 
design under uncertainty). 
211 See Hill, supra note 18, at 73; Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & 
Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in 
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 38 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) 
(discussing the difficulty humans face in estimating low-probability 
outcomes); Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 1, 4–5 (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000). Much of the literature on law 
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better equipped, however, to make decisions under risk.212 
The distinction between risk and uncertainty is that unlike 
uncertainty, risk involves a known set of possible outcomes 
and the probability distribution of those outcomes.213 A coin 
flip is the classic example of risk: the coin flipper knows that 
the two possible outcomes are heads or tails and that the 
likelihood of each is fifty percent. Most people would much 
rather make a decision using a coin flip as opposed to a 
method with unknown outcomes and probabilities. While real-
world situations are generally far more complex and often 
involve a mix of uncertainty and risk, the core observation is 
that humans are better equipped to make decisions when they 
have information on possible outcomes and their likelihoods. 
Accurately assessing risk is especially important in the 
context of contracting because risk allocation is a key feature 
of many contracts.214 
 
and behavioral economics builds on the work of Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect 
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: 
Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 
(1992); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251 
(1986). 
212 See Hill, supra note 18, at 74–75. 
213 See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, 198–99 (1921) 
(proposing the original distinction between risk and uncertainty); see also 
Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative 
Ignorance, 110 Q.J. ECON. 585, 585 (1995); Hill, supra note 18, at 74–75. 
214 See Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk 
Through Reverse Termination Fees, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1163–68 (2010) 
(discussing the role of reverse termination fees in the allocation of risk in 
corporate acquisitions); Choi & Triantis, supra note 81, at 851 (arguing that 
risk allocation is a significant component of contract design that enables 
efficient decisions regarding investment, contracting, and trade); Robert T. 
Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through MAC Clauses 
in Business Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2007, 2007–
09 (2009) (presenting the results of an empirical study of risk allocation via 
material adverse change (“MAC”) clauses in corporate acquisitions, finding 
that MAC clauses typically allocate four types of risk: systematic risks, 
indicator risks, agreement risks, and business risks). 
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Companies are currently using contract data to facilitate 
more effective contract risk assessment and allocation. For 
example, Microsoft tracks contract risks identified during the 
contract design stage to determine how frequently these risks 
occur. The company then uses this information to inform the 
design of future contracts.215 When Microsoft negotiates a 
contract, the contract team puts together a risk profile of the 
expected risks associated with the contract.216 The company 
uses this risk profile when determining whether to enter into 
the contract and whether to negotiate specific nonstandard 
terms.217 After the contract is signed, Microsoft tracks which 
of the identified risks (if any) occur during the performance of 
the contract as well as any unidentified risks.218 The company 
then uses these data to update its standard terms and 
improve its risk assessment process.219 For example, if 
Microsoft always negotiates against the inclusion of a 
particular type of penalty provision, but then the data show 
that the penalty in question never occurs, the company can 
consider altering its assessment of the riskiness of such a 
provision.220 Microsoft’s system for tracking contract risk data 
allows it to make better-informed risk assessment and 
allocation decisions. 
Predictive contracting can enable parties to convert 
contract uncertainty into contract risk. By tracking contract 
outcomes, a predictive contracting system can provide 
contract drafters with information on the set of potential 
contingent states and their respective likelihoods, thereby 
quantifying uncertainty. Equipped with distributional 
information on contract outcomes, contract drafters can more 
effectively assess contract risk. In addition, a predictive 
contracting system can identify connections between contract 
design and contract risks. This allows contract drafters to 
better evaluate the risk profile of a contract given its terms 
 
215 Telephone Interview with Microsoft Representatives, supra note 87. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
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and relevant exogenous conditions. Predictive contracting also 
creates opportunities for new term designs that use 
distributional data on contract outcomes. Contract drafters 
can use outcome probability distributions to craft terms that 
have contingent effects based on the relation of a given 
outcome to the expected probability distribution of that 
outcome. These terms could enable contract drafters to more 
effectively allocate contract risk. 
6. Negotiation and Term Pricing 
According to the efficient contracting literature, the goal of 
contracting parties is to maximize the joint value created by 
the contract.221 Parties select the set of contract terms that 
maximize the joint value and then divide up the value via the 
price term based on their relative bargaining power.222 Under 
this view, parties optimize for the size of the pie, not how the 
pie is sliced. This view relies on the unrealistic assumption, 
however, that parties contract under perfect conditions, 
including full information and no transaction costs.223 In the 
presence of contracting imperfections, such as asymmetric 
information, parties are often unable to achieve the value-
maximizing contract design.224 Instead of focusing on joint 
 
221 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
222 This view has been described as an “irrelevance” theory of 
bargaining power because according to this theory, the relative bargaining 
power of the parties does not affect the design of the contract, but rather 
only affects the price. See Williams, supra note 2, at 106–07; Choi & 
Triantis, supra note 2, at 1670. 
223 See Williams, supra note 2, at 110.  
224 See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 32–
33 (1995); LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 222, at 38–40, 245–46; ROBERT H. 
MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND WINNING: 
NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 9 (2000); Ian Ayres 
& Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal 
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 736–37, 742 (1992); Choi & 
Triantis, supra note 2, at 1687–89; Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property 
Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1132 (1990); Jason 
Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract 
Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 615–16, 636–37 (1990); Korobkin, supra 
note 18, at 1206 (arguing that costly information leads parties to choose 
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value maximization, parties typically use their bargaining 
power to jockey for contract terms that are allocatively 
advantageous but not necessarily value-maximizing.225 In 
their efforts to secure a larger piece of the pie, parties often 
end up with a smaller pie. 
Predictive contracting can improve contract design in the 
presence of contracting imperfections by providing parties 
with better information on the value of specific contract terms. 
This information enables parties to more accurately price 
contract terms during the negotiation process.226 For 
example, assume two parties are negotiating which version of 
a term to include in a contract. Party A prefers Version 1 and 
Party B prefers Version 2. Under traditional contracting, in 
the presence of incomplete information, the parties would 
likely use their relative bargaining power to determine which 
version of the term to include. Assume, however, that the 
parties have access to a predictive contracting system that can 
 
inefficient, allocatively advantageous terms as opposed to efficient terms); 
Williams, supra note 2, at 113–15. 
225 See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Market Conditions and Contract 
Design: Variations in Debt Contracting, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 51, 53–55 (2013) 
(discussing how lending covenants were primarily borrower-friendly from 
2000–2007 and then shifted to be lender-friendly after the financial crisis); 
Choi & Triantis, supra note 2, at 1693 (discussing how material adverse 
change definitions in merger agreements shift between seller-friendly and 
buyer-friendly forms); de Fontenay, supra note 112, at 395–98, 405–13; 
Williams, supra note 2, at 151–58 (finding a statistically significant 
connection between bargaining power and a variety of venture capital 
financing terms in venture capital contracts from 2004–2015); Joseph W. 
Bartlett, Sea Change, VC EXPERTS, https://www.vcexperts.com/ 
reference/buzz/63 [https://perma.cc/Q539-7V2P] (discussing how venture 
financing terms became much more investor-friendly following the dot com 
crash of 2000–2001). 
226 Large law firms currently use privately compiled contract data to 
help their clients gain a bargaining advantage via more accurate term 
pricing. See de Fontenay, supra note 112, at 396–98. Law firms only use 
these data to engage in relative term pricing, however, as opposed to 
absolute pricing. Id. at 425–26 (“[T]ransactional lawyers are likely to be 
more accurate at ranking terms against one another (‘Term A should be 
worth more to you than Term B’) than at ascribing a specific value to each 
term (‘Term A should be worth x dollars to you’).”). Predictive contracting 
can enable term pricing that is far closer to absolute pricing. 
2019.2_WILLIAMS_FINAL 4/27/2019 4:19 AM 
682 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
identify the expected values of the terms for each party. For 
example, assume Version 1 has an expected value of $20 for 
Party A and $10 for Party B and Version 2 has an expected 
value of $10 for Party A and $30 for Party B. Using this 
information, the parties can see that the joint expected value 
of Version 2 ($40) is $10 greater than the joint expected value 
of Version 1 ($30). Even if Party A has greater relative 
bargaining power, Party A is still likely to agree to use Version 
2 in exchange for a more favorable price term.227 Predictive 
contracting moves real world contracting closer to the full 
information assumption of efficient contracting theory, 
thereby increasing the likelihood that parties select the set of 
contract terms that maximize the joint value of the 
contract.228 
B. Practical Implications 
Predictive contracting has practical implications for the 
contracting ecosystem, particularly for the transactional 
lawyers (both at law firms and in-house) who frequently serve 
as the primary drafters of business contracts. Technological 
innovation in the legal industry has frequently been 
characterized as an existential threat to lawyers.229 This is a 
familiar narrative in a world in which jobs long done by 
humans are being automated at a rapid pace.230 Yet, despite 
proposing to automate many tasks traditionally performed by 
transactional lawyers, predictive contracting will not make 
transactional lawyers obsolete. To the contrary, predictive 
 
227 This example is a contractual application of the Coase Theorem. See 
supra note 17. 
228 This assumes that both parties have access to predictive contracting 
systems. For a discussion of the risks that arise when only one party has 
access to predictive contracting, see infra Section III.C.4. 
229 See RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE 
NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 99–146 (2010); RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S 
LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE 43–58 (2d ed. 2017). 
230 See generally Natalie Kitroeff, Robots Could Replace 1.7 Million 
American Truckers in the Next Decade, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 25, 2016), 
http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-fi-automated-trucks-labor-20160924 
[https://perma.cc/WLL5-NH9R]. 
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contracting has the potential to make transactional lawyers 
more valuable than ever before by providing them with access 
to previously unavailable information on the statistical 
connections between contract terms and outcomes. This newly 
available information will likely significantly change the role 
of transactional lawyers. 
In his pivotal article in 1984, Ronald Gilson characterized 
transactional lawyers as “transaction cost engineers.”231 
According to Gilson, transactional lawyers add value to a 
transaction by reducing the costs associated with that 
transaction by more than the fee they charge.232 Lawyers 
accomplish this goal through the use of contract mechanisms, 
such as representations, warranties, and indemnification 
provisions.233 Since Gilson’s pioneering work, legal 
commentators have proposed additional roles for 
transactional lawyers including reputational 
intermediaries,234 regulatory compliance experts,235 and 
enterprise architects.236 More recently, Elizabeth de Fontenay 
has noted that transactional lawyers at large law firms add 
value by collecting data on private deal terms that they use to 
provide market insights to their clients.237  
Predictive contracting will enable two additional roles for 
transactional lawyers to complement those discussed above. 
 
231 Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills 
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984); see also Lisa Bernstein, The 
Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REV. 239, 
251–52 (1995); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword: Business 
Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995).  
232 See Gilson, supra note 231, at 255. 
233 See generally id. at 256–93. 
234 See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-
Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 53, 94 (1986); Karl S. 
Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15, 18–19 
(1995); Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm 
Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1739–40 (1998). 
235 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional 
Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L., BUS. & FIN. 486, 500 (2007). 
236 See George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 
64 BUS. LAW. 279, 317 (2009). 
237 See de Fontenay, supra note 112, at 395–98. 
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The first new role is outcome engineer. Similar to Gilson’s 
transaction cost engineers who use contractual mechanisms 
to reduce transaction costs, outcome engineers will use 
predictive contracting to help clients achieve their desired 
outcomes. Outcome engineers will accomplish this by helping 
their clients understand the likely effects of contract terms on 
outcomes as identified by a predictive contracting system. In 
addition, outcome engineers will assist their clients in 
weighing tradeoffs between expected outcomes. For example, 
an outcome engineer could use a predictive contracting system 
to identify that Term A typically results in a lower quality of 
counterparty performance but also has a lower likelihood of 
causing a dispute, whereas Term B results in higher 
performance quality but causes more disputes. The outcome 
engineer could use this information to help her client balance 
performance quality against dispute likelihood. After 
discussing the potential effects of terms on outcomes and the 
tradeoffs between expected outcomes, an outcome engineer 
can design a contract that is tailored to achieve her client’s 
desired set of outcomes. 
The second new role for transactional lawyers enabled by 
predictive contracting is contract innovator. As was discussed 
in Section II.A.2, predictive contracting will promote contract 
innovation by helping contract drafters understand the 
potential effects of new terms on outcomes. These new terms, 
however, must still be created by humans. Transactional 
lawyers will therefore have a pivotal role to play in creating 
innovative terms that can then be used and analyzed by a 
predictive contracting system. The generation of new terms 
will begin with a creative contract innovator who designs an 
initial version of a new term. During the design process, the 
innovator can use a predictive contracting system to gain 
insights into the potential effects of the new term based on 
ontological similarities with existing terms.238 Once the new 
term is put into use in contracts, the innovator can track the 
term’s performance using predictive contracting and modify 
 
238 See supra Section III.A.2. 
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subsequent versions of the term based on real-world outcome 
data. 
Along with creating new roles, predictive contracting will 
also alter the set of skills that are important for the practice 
of transactional law. One of the hallmarks of a valuable 
transactional lawyer has traditionally been a substantial 
amount of experience and the anecdotal deal knowledge that 
comes with that experience. Business lawyers have long 
advised their clients based on their prior experiences with 
similar transactions. Yet, in the presence of a predictive 
contracting system trained on thousands of prior contracts, a 
lawyer’s anecdotal knowledge of past deals will become less 
valuable. While experience will still be important, a lawyer’s 
memory will no longer be needed to serve as a rudimentary 
database of deal terms and outcomes. In addition, a lawyer’s 
ability to “guesstimate” the effects of terms on outcomes will 
not be necessary when a predictive contracting system can 
provide concrete statistical evidence of those effects. On the 
other hand, skills that cannot be replicated by a predictive 
contracting system will become even more valuable. This is 
especially true of skills oriented towards human interaction, 
including client counseling and negotiation. Furthermore, 
creativity and the ability to innovate will be incredibly 
valuable as these skills will enable a transactional attorney to 
design new terms. 
 Predictive contracting will also affect the relationship 
between law firms and their clients. As de Fontenay discusses, 
large law firms provide value to their clients partly through 
market knowledge derived from data they collect on private 
deal terms.239 Predictive contracting systems, however, will 
likely provide more extensive, robust, and granular data on 
contract terms than the data that is currently collected by 
large law firms. As a result, law firms may lose some of the 
advantages that their term databases have traditionally 
provided to them. Clients are much better situated to collect 
data on contract outcomes because they are the entities that 
are directly affected by those outcomes. By making term data 
 
239 See de Fontenay, supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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more broadly available and increasing the importance of 
outcome data, predictive contracting will likely weaken the 
position of law firms relative to their clients. 
C. Limitations and Risks 
Predictive contracting faces a number of limitations and 
risks including: (1) technical constraints, (2) concerns 
regarding data privacy and confidentiality, (3) the regulation 
of the unauthorized practice of law, and (4) the potential for 
exacerbating information inequality. These issues are 
addressed in the Sections below. 
1. Technical Constraints 
Predictive contracting faces a number of technical 
constraints related to data sufficiency, representativeness, 
bias, and interpretability.  
The primary technical constraint that predictive 
contracting faces is collecting sufficient data on contract 
terms, outcomes, and conditions with which to train a 
machine learning model. Many contracting scenarios (like 
much of law) are highly complex systems.240 Models of 
complex systems require substantial amounts of data to 
generate accurate predictions. Despite developments in 
contract management, natural language processing, and 
computable contracts, there will still be challenges to contract 
data collection. First, some contracting scenarios will have so 
many relevant terms, outcomes, and conditions that the 
available data set will not be able to support the complexity of 
the scenario. As a result, initial applications of predictive 
 
240 See Katz, supra note 22, at 962 (describing legal systems as 
“complex adaptive systems with elaborate levels of complexity”). For a 
discussion of legal complexity, see generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE 
RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995); Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal 
Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 150 (1995); Peter H. 
Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 1 (1992); R. George Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity: An Explanation 
of Why the Law Can’t Just Be Less Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 715 
(2000). 
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contracting will likely be narrow in scope to reduce complexity 
and thereby require less data. As data sets become larger and 
more robust, users can expand their scope of analysis to 
include a greater number of terms, outcomes, and conditions. 
Second, some outcomes may occur so infrequently (such as 
“bet the company” litigation) that a model cannot be trained 
to predict these outcomes.  
Third, some data may be incredibly difficult or even 
impossible to collect, such as the effects of relational 
contracting.241 This highlights one of the key limitations of 
predictive contracting: if a term, condition, or outcome cannot 
be represented as machine-interpretable data, it cannot be 
analyzed using predictive contracting. Fortunately, many of 
these variables can be represented in a predictive contracting 
model with proxy variables that are much easier to obtain. 
With respect to relational contracting, for example, the 
presence of relational contracting can be proxied by a variable, 
such as the length of any prior contracting relationship 
between the parties. As discussed above, early applications of 
predictive contracting will focus on relatively simple 
contracting scenarios and will likely not include difficult-to-
obtain variables such as the effects of relational contracting. 
As predictive contracting systems and their associated data 
sets improve and start to analyze more complex contracting 
scenarios, the ability to identify effective proxies for difficult-
to-obtain variables will become a key feature of model design. 
Another technical concern is whether the contracts in the 
training set are representative of future contracts. Machine 
 
241 See Surden, supra note 108, at 683–84 (defining a relational 
contract as one in which “the parties are incapable of reducing important 
terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations”) (quoting Charles J. 
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 
1089, 1091 (1981)); Surden, supra note 35, at 106–07. For a discussion of 
relational contracting and the role of norms and institutions, see generally 
Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network 
Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561 (2015); Lisa 
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations 
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, 
Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). 
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learning models struggle at predicting outcomes for scenarios 
that differ substantially from their training data.242 For 
example, a contract drafter should not use a predictive 
contracting model trained on sales agreements to predict the 
cost of drafting a licensing agreement. A predictive 
contracting model will produce far more accurate predictions 
if the contracting scenarios being analyzed are similar to those 
on which the model was trained. Users can help ensure the 
representativeness of a predictive contracting model by 
periodically updating the training set with new contracts and 
using this updated data set to retrain the model. 
A predictive contracting model can also produce inaccurate 
predictions if the training set is systematically biased.243 For 
example, if a predictive contracting model is trained on a set 
of contracts all drafted by the same law firm, and the firm has 
an idiosyncratic preference for a particular set of terms, the 
model will be biased in favor of these terms. When training a 
model, contract drafters should be aware of potential biases in 
the training set. In addition, machine learning researchers 
are developing methods to debias data sets.244 
Predictive contracting systems will also face challenges 
regarding the interpretability of their results. Like other 
prediction systems based on machine learning, predictive 
contracting systems will not necessarily be able to tell contract 
drafters why the identified connections between contract 
terms and outcomes exist. While “black box” models are useful 
for identifying connections that are otherwise difficult or 
impossible to identify, understanding the source of these 
 
242 See Dolin, supra note 82, at 2; Ng, supra note 72, at 30–31; Remus 
& Levy, supra note 44, at 511 (using the example of autonomous vehicles 
having difficulty driving on roads that contain hazards not contained in 
their training sets); Surden, supra note 35, at 105. But see McKamey, supra 
note 40, at 52–54.  
243 See Surden, supra note 35, at 106. 
244 See Tolga Bolukbasi, Kai-Wei Chang, James Zou, Venkatesh 
Saligrama & Adam Kalai, Quantifying and Reducing Stereotypes in Word 
Embeddings, 2016 ICML Workshop on #Data4Good: Machine Learning in 
Social Good Applications, at 43 (2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.06121.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UB8W-ZDVK] (developing an algorithm to reduce gender 
stereotyping in text data). 
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connections is important for contract drafters to make 
informed contract design decisions.245 Contract drafters will 
need to use their knowledge and expertise to interpret the 
results of predictive contracting models. In addition, machine 
learning researchers are developing methods to increase the 
interpretability of machine learning models.246 
2. Privacy and Confidentiality 
Concerns about data privacy and confidentiality have 
increased substantially in recent years. Numerous large 
companies have had customer data stolen or misused.247 
Governments have responded by stepping up scrutiny of how 
companies collect, store, and use customer data, most notably 
the General Data Protection Regulation in the European 
 
245 See Katz, supra note 22, at 950 n.198 and accompanying text; 
Scholz, supra note 156, at 160 (describing how many companies use 
machine learning algorithms to “poke around looking for patterns” in data 
without understanding why those patterns exist). 
246 See Been Kim, Martin Wattenberg, Justin Gilmer, Carrie Cai, 
James Wexler, Fernanda Viegas & Rory Sayres, Interpretability Beyond 
Feature Attribution: Quantitative Testing with Concept Activation Vectors 
(TCAV) 1 (June 7, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/ 
abs/1711.11279 [https://perma.cc/ARA9-BX8N] (introducing Concept 
Activation Vectors, which can be used to assist in the interpretation of 
machine learning models). 
247 In 2017, Equifax, one of the major consumer credit agencies in the 
United States, experienced a massive security breach that compromised the 
personal information of tens of millions of Americans. See Tara Siegel 
Bernard, Tiffany Hsu, Nicole Perlroth & Ron Lieber, Equifax Says 
Cyberattack May Have Affected 143 Million in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 7, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/business/equifax-
cyberattack.html [https://perma.cc/W7RM-D97L]. In 2018, Facebook 
announced that the data of millions of users had been improperly accessed 
by Cambridge Analytica, a political consulting firm associated with the 
Trump campaign during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. See Cecilia 
Kang & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Says Cambridge Analytica Harvested 
Data of Up to 87 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/mark-zuckerberg-testify-
congress.html [https://perma.cc/A5QQ-Y575]. The Cambridge Analytica 
scandal resulted in Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook’s founder and CEO, being 
called to testify before Congress about Facebook’s data security and privacy 
controls. Id. 
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Union.248 Predictive contracting, like other technology 
systems that use data to predict outcomes, will encounter 
privacy challenges related to the collection, storage, and use 
of contract data.249 In addition, there will likely be added 
complexity due to professional regulations that restrict how 
lawyers may share confidential client information.250 
Contract technology companies frequently cite data privacy as 
one of their clients’ main concerns.251 For contract technology 
companies developing machine learning systems, user privacy 
concerns are the main hurdle to pooling contract data from 
 
248 See EUGDPR, https://www.eugdpr.org [https://perma.cc/8WBN-
XNU7] (“The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). . .[was] 
designed to [h]armonize data privacy laws across Europe, [to] protect and 
empower all EU citizens data privacy, [and to] [r]eshape the way 
organizations across the region approach data privacy.”). Violations of 
GDPR can result in potentially serious penalties for offending companies. 
See GDPR Key Changes, EUGDPR, https://www.eugdpr.org/the-
regulation.html [https://perma.cc/4ZW9-6WT7] (noting that under GDPR, 
“[o]rganizations in breach of GDPR can be fined up to 4% of annual global 
turnover or €20 Million (whichever is greater).”). 
249 See Casey & Niblett, supra note 42, at 50–51. For a discussion of the 
intersection of privacy law and data collection, see generally Lisa Austin, 
Privacy and the Question of Technology, 22 L. & PHIL. 119 (2003); Omer 
Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time for Big 
Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63 (2012); Omer Tene & Jules 
Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of 
Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP. 239 (2013); Paul M. Schwartz, 
Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1623 (2013); PRIVACY, 
BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT (Julia 
Lane, Victoria Stodden, Stefan Bender & Helen Nissenbaum eds., 2014). 
250 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008) 
(“A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly 
authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is 
permitted by paragraph (b)”); see also de Fontenay, supra note 112, at 428–
30. 
251 Interview with Contract Room Representative, in Palo Alto, Cal., 
supra note 96; Telephone Interview with Beagle Representative, supra note 
119; Telephone Interview with Contract Assistant Representative, supra 
note 111; Telephone Interview with Contract Standards Representative 
(Mar. 6, 2018); Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, 
supra note 60. 
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multiple customers to increase the size of training sets.252 
Companies that build predictive contracting systems will need 
to be highly diligent with respect to how they handle user 
data. A security breach or other misuse of user data could 
mean the end of an otherwise promising predictive 
contracting company.  
Privacy also presents a problem for computable contracts, 
one of the key sources of contract data for predictive 
contracting systems. Due to the peer-to-peer nature of 
blockchain systems, the transactions on many computable 
contracts platforms are public. For sensitive contracting 
scenarios, parties are unlikely to use publicly viewable 
computable contracts due to privacy concerns. In response to 
this concern, computable contracts companies such as Oasis 
Labs are beginning to develop platforms that support 
“privacy-preserving” computable contracts.253 
3. Unauthorized Practice of Law 
A core feature of the regulation of the legal profession is 
that non-lawyers may not practice law.254 If a non-lawyer (or 
a company owned or managed by a non-lawyer) renders legal 
services, they run the risk of incurring liability for what is 
generally referred to as the “unauthorized practice of law” 
(“UPL”).255 While originally intended to prevent human non-
lawyers from practicing law, UPL regulations have been 
applied to legal technology companies owned and operated by 
non-lawyers.256 Legal technology commentators have noted 
 
252 Telephone Interview with Beagle Representative, supra note 119; 
Telephone Interview with Contract Standards Representative, supra note 
251; Telephone Interview with Kira Systems Representative, supra note 60. 
253 See Privacy-First Cloud Computing on Blockchain: A Non-Technical 
Primer, OASIS LABS, Nov. 2018, https://docsend.com/view/fsdz4hv 
[https://perma.cc/F5Z2-YKUY]. 
254 See e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6125–6133 (2018). 
255 Id. 
256 In 2017, three New Jersey Supreme Court Committees (Advisory 
Committee on Professional Ethics, Committee on Attorney Advertising, and 
Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law) issued a joint opinion 
finding that AVVO, LegalZoom, and Rocket Lawyer were all in violation of 
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that UPL regulations could create challenges for the use of 
machine learning in the provision of legal services.257 
The use of predictive contracting systems could potentially 
be limited by UPL regulations. Whether UPL regulations will 
apply to predictive contracting will depend in large part on 
whether the contract drafter using the predictive contracting 
system is a lawyer. The ABA has largely embraced the use of 
machine learning technology by lawyers.258 The ABA views 
the use of such technology by lawyers similarly to employing 
a non-lawyer assistant, which is permissible under UPL 
regulations.259 This includes legal technology provided to a 
lawyer by a third-party company owned and operated by non-
lawyers.260 As a result, the use of predictive contracting 
systems by contract drafters who are lawyers will likely be 
permissible under UPL regulations. The permissibility of non-
lawyer contract drafters using predictive contracting, on the 
other hand, is much less clear. The general view has been that 
a company owned and operated by non-lawyers violates UPL 
regulations by providing legal services via a technology 
system.261 A recent court case, however, has called into 
question whether services provided by a technology system 
qualify as practicing law. In Lola v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
Meagher & Flom, LLP, the Second Circuit stated that “an 
 
UPL regulations (AVVO was found to offer an impermissible referral 
service, whereas LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer were found to be 
unregistered with the New Jersey Supreme Court). See N.J. Advisory 
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, ACPE Joint Opinion 732, at 8 (June 21, 2017), 
https://www.themodernfirm.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ACPE-732-
Avvo-LegalZoom-Rocket-Lawyer-6.21.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NEQ-
UNUW]. 
257 See Betts & Jaep, supra note 160, at 232; Dolin, supra note 82, at 3; 
McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 40, at 3059–64; Larry E. Ribstein, The Death 
of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 807–08 (2010); Ray Worthy Campbell, 
Rethinking Regulation and Innovation in the U.S. Legal Services Market, 9 
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 45–51 (2012). 
258 See McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 40, at 3059–61. 
259 Id. at 3060. 
260 Id. at 3060–61 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3 cmt. 
3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)). 
261 Id. at 3061–64. 
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individual who . . . undertakes tasks that could otherwise be 
performed entirely by a machine cannot be said to engage in 
the practice of law.”262 This reasoning suggests that the use of 
a technology system such as predictive contracting may not 
qualify as practicing law even if the individuals using the 
system are non-lawyers. 
4. Information Inequality 
Predictive contracting provides contract drafters with 
better information than they would otherwise have access to 
under traditional contracting. This information enables 
contract drafters to craft more effective contracts that 
increase the joint value generated by a transaction.263 The 
analysis of predictive contracting thus far, however, has 
assumed that all parties to a contract have access to predictive 
contracting systems. If, on the other hand, only one party has 
access to predictive contracting, that party will have a 
substantial information advantage during the negotiation and 
design of the contract. When one party has a large information 
advantage, that party tends to use its advantage to extract 
value from its counterparty via potentially inefficient but 
allocatively advantageous terms.264 In the context of business-
to-business contracting, it is reasonable to assume that as 
predictive contracting systems demonstrate their value in the 
market, more businesses will start to use such systems, 
thereby decreasing the likelihood that a party will have an 
information advantage relative to its counterparty. This 
assumption cannot be made, however, in the context of 
business-to-consumer contracting. There is a large body of 
literature on consumer contracts that highlights the 
information and bargaining power disparity between 
 
262 Lola v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom L.L.P., 620 F. App’x. 
37, 45 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that document review did not per se meet 
North Carolina’s definition of practicing law). This case is the first to use 
this reasoning. 
263 See supra Section III.A.6. 
264 See supra Section III.A.6. 
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businesses and consumers.265 Unlike businesses, consumers 
are highly unlikely to have access to predictive contracting 
systems. As a result, predictive contracting has the potential 
to exacerbate the information inequality that already exists in 
the consumer contracting context. For example, a business 
could use a predictive contracting system to identify the set of 
contract terms that best advantage the business at the 
expense of the consumer.266 The potential effects of predictive 
contracting on consumer contracts will need to be closely 
monitored.267 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article examined how contract drafters can use data 
on contract outcomes to inform contract design. Building on 
recent developments in contract data collection and analysis, 
the Article proposed predictive contracting, a new method of 
contracting in which contract drafters can design contracts 
using a technology system that helps predict the connections 
between contract terms and outcomes. The Article then 
discussed the theoretical and practical implications of 
predictive contracting. On a theoretical level, predictive 
contracting can lead to greater customization, increased 
innovation, more complete contract design, more effective 
balancing of front-end and back-end costs, better risk 
assessment and allocation, and more accurate term pricing for 
negotiation. On a practical level, predictive contracting has 
the potential to significantly alter the role of transactional 
 
265 See supra note 74. 
266 But see G. Marcus Cole, Rational Consumer Ignorance: When and 
Why Consumers Should Agree to Form Contracts Without Even Reading 
Them, 11 J.L., ECON. & POL’Y 413, 413–16 (2015) (arguing that consumer 
contracts in competitive markets should be consumer-favorable due to 
competition between businesses with respect to contract terms. In less 
competitive markets, however, businesses with monopoly or oligopoly 
market positions are more likely to include terms harmful to consumers). 
267 Consumer protection organizations, such as CLAUDETTE, are 
starting to use machine learning to identify unlawful and/or harmful terms 
in consumer contracts. See About, CLAUDETTE, http://claudette.eui. 
eu/about/index.html [https://perma.cc/EM8Z-WZXG]. 
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lawyers by providing them with access to previously 
unavailable information on the statistical connections 
between contract terms and outcomes. The Article also 
discussed a number of risks and limitations faced by 
predictive contracting, including technical constraints, 
concerns regarding data privacy and confidentiality, the 
regulation of the unauthorized practice of law, and the 
potential for exacerbating information inequality. 
Further research is required to more fully develop 
predictive contracting. The first step is to build a working 
prototype of a predictive contracting system using real-world 
contract data. In addition to developing a prototype, future 
research should examine how computable contracts can best 
be used as mechanisms for contract data collection. Of the 
three sources of contract data discussed in this Article, 
computable contracts have the greatest potential to collect 
machine-readable contract data at scale. While computable 
contracts are still in a nascent stage of development, 
blockchain companies, such as Ethereum, are starting to push 
computable contracts towards mainstream use. Designing 
computable contracting systems with data collection in mind 
is critical for the long-term success of predictive contracting. 
Lastly, subsequent research should explore the risks posed by 
predictive contracting, particularly the potential for 
exacerbating information inequality between asymmetrically 
situated parties such as in consumer contracting. 
 
